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Dynamic access

The programs presented here are designed to help systems programmers who may occasionally need the RACF SPECIAL or OPERATIONS attribute added, in order to perform certain functions. They dynamically give the caller the SPECIAL, OPERATIONS attribute for the life of the session only. Note that although the access is granted by the programs rather than the RACF administrator, the administrator should maintain the programs, by controlling who can access them. Note also that all commands issued to the sysprog invoking the program will be reported in SMF for later auditing.

THE PROCESS

The first program is a user SVC program designed to place the caller in an Authorized state and check which user(s) are allowed to use the program. The second program is a command processor which the user runs to be granted the access given by the SVC program.

DETAIL

You should place the IGC0023C program in SYS1.PARMLIB (IEALPAx) and code as follows:

```
INCLUDE LIBRARY(dsn)
MODULES(IGC0023C)
```

(Dsn – the location of IGC0023C module; the dsn must be APF authorized.)

The RACACC program must be placed in an APF authorized dataset. This dataset should be concatenated in your log-on proc via //STEPLIB DD.

INVOKING THE PROGRAM

Once the programs have been assembled and linked, an IPL is required for the SVC module. To invoke, issue:

```
TSO RACACC
```
IGC0023C SOURCE

IGC0023C TITLE 'AUTHORIZATION SVC'

* FUNCTION -
* THIS USER SVC WILL PUT THE USER IN AN AUTHORIZED STATE.
* PLACE IN IEALPAXX MEMBER OF SYS1.PARMLIB
* PROCESS: ONLY SELECTED USERS CAN INVOKE THIS PROGRAM.
* LINKED AS IGC0023C RENT,REFR
* THIS MODULE TO BE MLPA
* IF RØ CONTAINS Ø AUTH IS GRANTED, IF NOT AUTH IS RESET
*

EJECT
IGC0023 CSECT
LR 12,6 LOAD ENTRY POINT ADDR
USING IGC0023,12 ADDRESSABILITY
L 2,'6C'(7) POINT AT ASXB
CLC X'C0'(3,2),USER1
BE OK
CLC X'C0'(4,2),USER2
BE OK
CLC X'C0'(4,2),USER3
BE OK
B RETURN NOT AUTH USER

OK L 2,18O(4) POINT R2 TO JSCB
BCT Ø,AUTHOFF IF,AFTER BCT, RØ NOT = Ø ,TURN OFF
AUTHON EQU *
OI 236(2),X'01' TURN ON AUTHORIZATION BIT
B RETURN EXIT IN AUTHORIZED STATE
AUTHOFF EQU *
NI 236(2),X'FE' TURN OFF AUTHORIZATION BIT
RETURN EQU *
BR 14 RETURN TO SPFCOPY
*list of users allowed to run the program
USER1 DC C'060' ALLOW THIS USER
USER3 DC C'056' ALLOW THIS USER
USER2 DC C'CICS' ALLOW THIS USER
END IGC00233

RACACC SOURCE

RACACC TITLE 'ACEE'
REPRO
NAME RACACC(R)
REGS
RACACC CSECT
SAVE (14,12), RACACC & SYSDATE, & SYSTIME
LR R12,R15 SET ADDRESSABILITY
USING RACACC,R12
LA R6,SAVEAREA POINT AT MY SA
ST R6,8(R13) STORE IN CALLERS SA
ST R13,SAVEAREA+4 STORE CALLERS IN MY SA
LR R13,R6 LOAD MY SA ADDR
LA Ø,1 REQUEST AUTH
SVC 233
MODESET KEY=ZERO
L 5,X'224' POINTER TO ASCB
L 5,X'6C'(5) POINTER TO ASXB
L 5,X'C8'(5) POINTER TO ACEE
NI X'26'(5),X'Ø0' SPEC ATTR
OI X'26'(5),X'B1' OPER ATTR
* OI X'27'(5),X'Ø0' ALTER ACCESS
NI X'27'(5),X'Ø0' TURN OFF NO ACCESS
OI X'27'(5),X'80' ALTER ACCESS
MODESET KEY=NZERO
LA RØ,Ø AUTH OFF
SVC 233 CALL THIS SVC FOR AUTH
B RETURN
* OPEN (SYSPRINT,(OUTPUT))
PRINT PUT SYSPRINT,PRINTLNE
MVI CC,X'4Ø' CLEAR
MVC PRLINE,CC PRINT
MVI CC,X'Ø9' LINE
BR R1Ø
* RETURN DS ØH
CLOSE (SYSPRINT)
L 13,SAVEAREA+4
LH R15,RCODE LOAD RETURN CODE
RETURN (14,12),RC=(15)
SAVEAREA DS 18F
RCODE DC H'Ø'
PRINTLNE DS ØCL133
CC DS CL1
PRLINE DS CL132
SYSPRINT DCB DSORG=PS, BLKSIZE=133, DDNAME=SYSPRINT, & MACRF=PM, RECFM=FM, LRECL=133
LTORG
TITLE 'ACEE'
IHAACEE
END RACACC

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Authentication using the RACF PassTicket

The RACF PassTicket is an alternative to the RACF password that enables remote clients on workstations to get authenticated to the host system. This means that the user can gain access to the host without sending the RACF password in clear across a network which, with the advent of the Internet, is now ‘full of villains’ (in IBM speak). Note that, while the PassTicket is excellent for telnet and traditional 3270 applications, it faces stiff competition from the digital certificate targeted for Web applications and now supported by recent versions of OS/390.

The RACF PassTicket doesn’t replace the regular RACF password, which remains usable. Rather, it’s a cryptographically-generated, short-lifespan password substitute. It’s more secure than passwords because it’s valid for a period of plus or minus 10 minutes (as measured on the mainframe’s GMT clock) and it can’t be reused. So, even if some ‘villain’ did manage to capture it by eavesdropping or hacking the network or the routers, it would be useless to him.

The PassTicket is always an alphanumeric, eight-character string – say, for example, 5PX9A4UZ. At first, RACF can’t tell that a PassTicket is being presented rather than a regular password. But when it authenticates a password field and determines that it’s not the password for the userid, RACF performs a second authentication step to determine whether the password field is a valid PassTicket. This is why you may see two RACF messages in the SYSLOG if the PassTicket is invalid.

USAGES

The RACF PassTicket has a number of uses, for instance:

- It means that you can connect to your site from the outside world (ftp, telnet) without the security hazard of transmitting the password in clear.
- It enables you to avoid coding passwords in clear in batch jobs or input data (FTP commands in a batch job).
• With CICS or IMS, you may now submit a job under a user’s authority without prompting the user for his password.

• You can submit jobs via NJE to other nodes; it is then recommended that your MVS or OS/390 systems should run with MVS GMT time = real GMT time.

• You can ‘lend’ a userid + a PassTicket value to somebody, for test or maintenance, for a short period of time. Note that once that user logs off, he cannot reconnect.

The PassTicket is not recommended for Web applications. This is because, when you access protected Web pages, the password is transmitted in the HTTP header at each interaction. Because the PassTicket is not reusable, a different PassTicket would be generated each time, which would be extremely inconvenient.

PASSTICKET GENERATION PROCESS

Unlike the standard password, the PassTicket applies to only one application. It must be generated locally. The algorithm that generates the PassTicket is a function of:

• The userid of the client.
• The application id (CICS applid, IMS id, etc).
• A secured sign-on application key, known to both sides (RACF and the local generator).
• A time and date stamp.

In order to generate a PassTicket, you need to define a shared key or secret between the systems on which the client and the security server are running. This key depends on the application and optionally (and hopefully) on the user. The application-id is the same as the profile you would put in the RACF APPL class for protecting the access to the application. For TSO, it is TSO + SMF id.

Applications that don’t specify an APPL parameter get a default APPL, for PassTicket purposes only, of ‘MVS’ followed by the system’s SMF id. This works also for batch jobs.
On MVS, you can use the generation routine that RACF provides. An example is shown below.

* PASSTICKET GENERATION EXAMPLE

```plaintext
SETAMOD 31                 Personal macro to be in 31-bit amode
MODESET KEY=ZERO,MODE=SUP  Become authorized
L     R15,16               Point to CVT
USING CVT,R15              CVT addressability
L     R15,CVTRAC           Point to RACF CVT
USING RCVT,R15             RCVT addressability
L     R15,RCVTPTGN         Point to PassTicket routine
CALL (15),(USER,APPLIC)   Call PassTicket generator routine
ST    R15,RC               Let's save the return code
STM   RØ,R1,PTKTVAL        Let's store the PassTicket value
MODESET KEY=NZERO,MODE=PROBLEM's drop authorization
SETAMOD 24                 Personal macro to be in 24-bit amode
OC    RC,RC                Return code must be zero
BNZ   ERROR                Error: no PTKTDATA profile or ACEE, etc
```

* WORK DATA

```plaintext
PTKTVAL  DS    D                    Generated PassTicket value
USER     DS    ØCL9                 Userid data :
  DS    AL1(7)   - number of userid characters
  DS    CL8'IBMUSER '   - value for the userid
APPLIC   DS    ØCL9                 Application data :
  DS    AL1(4)   - number of application characters
  DS    CL8'IMS1 '   - value for the application name
RC       DS    F                    Return Code
CVT     DSECT=YES               , CVT
ICHPRCVT                   , RACF CVT
```

The CICS Front End Programming Interface (FEPI), an integral part of CICS, can also be used to generate a PassTicket:

```plaintext
EXEC CICS FEPI REQUEST PASSTICKET
```

requests the external security manager to supply a PassTicket.

On other platforms, PassTickets can be generated in several ways:

- Develop your own routine, using the algorithm described in the *RACF Macros and Interfaces* documentation. Though not an easy task, this is possible (see below).
- Buy a commercial product that generates PassTickets on your platform.
- Implement a complete enterprise solution, like a single sign-on

The most common cause for technical problems with PassTicket verification stems from differences in time settings. When PassTickets are created on a Windows or Unix machine and are verified by RACF on OS/390, both machines must be at the same GMT (or UTC – Universal Time Coordinated) time.

SECURITY ASSESSMENT

In fact, of course, the PassTicket concept merely displaces the security issue so that the weak link is no longer the network, but instead the PassTicket generator, and chiefly the secure keys. The secret Secured Sign-on application keys must not be easily compromised, otherwise a hacker could generate PassTickets on your behalf and use your userid at will (and changing your regular password won’t help here!).

One possible solution is to encipher the keys, or to store them on a trusted server, or even on a diskette that you keep in security (if you use a personal generator like the one I wrote). If they are compromised, you must immediately change their value on MVS by a RACF command.

Whether generation is done on the mainframe or on a remote site, I think PassTicket usage should be audited. SMF records type 80 are cut for event code 1 (RACINIT : job initiation, TSO logon or logoff) with event code qualifiers 32 (‘successful initiation using passticket’) and 33 (‘attempted replay of passticket’).

RACF IMPLEMENTATION

The first step in implementing a PassTicket is to activate the passticket class:

SETROPTS CLASSACT(PTKTDATA)
SETROPTS RACLIST(PTKTDATA)

You then define a profile for the userid + application:

RDEFINE PTKTDATA appl.group.userid
SSIGNON(KEYMASKED(0123456789abcdef))
where appl is to be replaced by the application name (CICS, TSO+SMFID, etc). Group and userid are the RACF group and userid, and 0123456789abcdef (the Secured Sign-on application key) should be replaced by a valid 16-digit secret key. Note that appl.group.userid can also be replaced by appl.userid if the connection group doesn’t matter. A more secure alternative to

SSIGNON(KEYMASKED(...))

is

SSIGNON(KEYENCRYPTED(...))

but this requires a cryptographic product to be active on the system.

Refresh the PTKTDATA class:

SETR REFRESH RACLIST(PTKTDATA)

Next, the userid, the application name, and the Secured Sign-on application key (the ‘secret factor’ that must be kept in security) must be known by the PassTicket generator.

Before RACF 2.2, an application was limited to a single key (‘unqualified’ PTKTDATA profile, with the application name only). It is preferable to use ‘qualified’ PassTicket profile names, with the user’s group name and userid.

RACF PASSTICKET GENERATOR FOR WINDOWS

My Passticket generator for Windows, PTKTGEN, is a software-only implementation of a RACF Passticket generator. It is a DOS program written in REXX; it invokes Megacrypt/DOS (a freeware) for encryption functions. Secured Sign-on application keys are stored in a ‘userid.INI’ file (where userid is the RACF userid). This is sensitive information that you should protect. This is why I call PTKTGEN an ‘unsecure Passticket generator’. PTKTGEN can be downloaded from:

http://os390-mvs.hypermart.net/ptkt.zip

You can use it for demonstration or educational purposes.

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etic software (France)  © Xephon 2000
RACF and DFSMS

With DFSMS, ownership of data has been introduced in RACF. Previously, when a dataset was opened, all authorization checking in RACF was performed against the user who invoked the function. In a DFSMS environment, however, the ACS routines are used to control which SMS constructs are assigned to a dataset. RACF is then called to check whether the assigned management and storage class can be used in the allocation of the dataset. The authority to use a storage class and management class is checked not against the user who allocated the dataset, but against the owner of the data. This will be the user or group specified in the RESOWNER field in the dataset profile that protects the dataset; if none is specified, it will default to the user or group named by the high-level qualifier of the dataset name.

DFSMS DEFAULTS

RACF stores the DFSMS defaults in user and group profiles. The DFSMS defaults are:

- DATAAPPL
- DATACLAS
- STORCLAS
- MGMTCLAS.

The use of RACF defaults for SMS constructs can give an installation a lot of flexibility in assigning default values to the various data owners. The major benefits are that:

- It can reduce the complexity of the ACS routines.
- It can eliminate the need for frequent change.

With default values stored in RACF profiles, the storage administrator can use RACF commands to change the values for users and groups. These changes take effect immediately.

To activate the DFSMS defaults in the ACS routines, the IGDSMSnn parmlib member must be specified as follows:
ACSDEFAULTS=YES

SMS will initialize the following ACS routine variables from an additional call to RACF:

- &APPLIC
- &DEF_DATACLAS
- &DEF_MGMTCLAS
- &DEF_STORCLAS

**DFSMS user defaults**

For each user defined to RACF there is a user profile. Part of the user profile is the DFP segment which contains four fields reserved for the DFSMS defaults. This is shown in Figure 1.

To change or delete any of the DFSMS defaults in a user profile, the storage administrator can issue the ALTUSER RACF command as follows:

```plaintext
ALTUSER userid DFP(DATAAPPL(.............)
             DATACLAS(............)
             MGMTCLAS(.........)
             STORCLAS(..........))
```

To list the DFSMS defaults for a particular user, enter the following RACF command:

```plaintext
LISTUSER userid DFP
```

**DFSMS group defaults**

A RACF group profile contains information about the group and about which users are connected to the group. Part of the group profile is the DFP segment which contains four fields reserved for the DFSMS defaults. This is shown in Figure 2.

To change or delete any of the DFSMS defaults in a group profile, the storage administrator can issue the ALTGROUP RACF command as follows:

```plaintext
ALTGROUP groupid DFP(DATAAPPL(.............)
            DATACLAS(............)
```
To list the DFSMS defaults for a particular group, enter the following RACF command:

```
LISTGRP groupid DFP
```

**DATASET PROFILES**

For a dataset to be protected by RACF, the HLQ must be defined to RACF as either a user profile or a group profile, and a RACF dataset profile must exist to protect the dataset. As part of the dataset profile, the DFP segment contains the RESOWNER field, in which you can
specify the owner of a system-managed dataset protected by the profile. The owner can be a RACF-defined user or group. If there is no RESOWNER specified in this field, the HLQ of the dataset becomes the dataset owner.

It is important to note that the dataset owner is not the same as the owner of the dataset profile. The owner of the dataset profile is used for security administration purposes, whereas the dataset owner is used in checking against the STORCLAS and MGMTCLAS profiles for access when allocating a dataset. The RESOWNER field is shown in Figure 3.

To list the RESOWNER field, issue the following RACF command:

```
LISTDSD DATASET('profile name') DFP GENERIC
```

**PROTECTING THE DFSMS STORCLAS AND MGMTCLAS**

RACF provides the following general resource classes defined in the RACF class descriptor table for protecting SMS management classes and SMS storage classes:

- **MGMTCLAS**
- **STORCLAS**

To define a general resource profile to RACF, the RDEFINE RACF command must be issued:
RDEFINE MGMTCLAS 'management class' OWNER(stgadmin) UACC(NONE)
RDEFINE STORCLAS 'storage class' OWNER(stgadmin) UACC(NONE)

The owner field of the profile should be the RACF group to which the storage administrator is connected. This will ensure that the storage administrators maintain control over the profile. To permit a user or group to access the resource class, use the RACF PERMIT command. For example, to give the group APG1 access to the SMS storage class STRCLAS1, enter the following command:

PERMIT STRCLAS1 CLASS(STORCLAS) ID(APG1) ACCESS(READ)

To list who is on the access list, use the AUTHUSER parameter of the RLIST RACF command as follows:

RLIST STORCLAS STRCLAS1 AUTHUSER

To activate the SMS classes, use the SETROPTS RACF command as follows:

SETROPTS RACLIST(STORCLAS MGMTCLAS)

When a general resource class is RACLISTED, the profile is available to all users, thereby eliminating the need for RACF to retrieve a profile each time a user requests access to a resource protected by that profile. As a result, when this process is activated, processing overhead is reduced.

If a new profile is added, changed, or deleted in one of the SMS classes, the in-storage profile needs to be refreshed as follows:

SETROPTS RACLIST(class-name) REFRESH

AUTHORIZATION CHECKING

The following information explains the steps that are performed when allocating a new SMS-managed dataset.

When a user allocates a new SMS-managed dataset, DFSMSdfp calls RACF and checks the RACF dataset profile for the dataset to be allocated. If a RESOWNER is specified in the RESOWNER field, this will then become the dataset owner; if not, the HLQ of the dataset becomes the dataset owner. If the SMS parmlib member IGDSMSnn contains the parameter ACSDEFAULTS=YES, DFSMSdfp then calls RACF and checks the dataset owner profile for the SMS defaults,
which are contained in the DFP segment. The dataset owner profile may be either a user profile or a group profile. The SMS defaults are obtained as follows:

- When the dataset owner is a group defined to RACF, the DFP segment of the group profile is checked for each default.
- When the dataset owner is a user defined to RACF, the DFP segment of the user profile is checked for each default. If a value is not found for a certain default in the DFP segment, the DFP segment of the user’s default group is checked. If a default is specified in this profile, this default is used.

The ACS routines are then invoked. The logic which is contained in the ACS routines may or may not use SMS defaults of the dataset owner. Once the ACS routines have been completed and the SMS classes have been assigned to the dataset to be allocated, RACF is called to resource-check the management class assigned.

The check is performed against the dataset owner. If the dataset owner has access to the management class, the assigned storage class is resource-checked. If the dataset owner does not have sufficient access to the storage class, the dataset allocation fails. If the dataset owner has the required access to both the management class and the storage class, dataset access checking is invoked. When dataset access checking is invoked, the user requesting the allocation is used in the access check and not the dataset owner. If the user has the required access to allocate the dataset, allocation is granted.

During authorization checking of the management class and storage class, the access list of the profile is checked. If the dataset owner has READ, UPDATE, or ALTER access to the profile, access is granted to the requested management class or storage class. If the dataset owner is on the access list with NONE or EXECUTE (less than READ), access is denied and allocation fails. If the dataset owner is a user and not a group, all the groups that the user is connected to are checked to see whether they have an access of READ, UPDATE, or ALTER to the resource. If any of these groups has this access level, access is granted to the requested management class or storage class. If no access is granted and there is a group defined on the access list with an access of NONE or EXECUTE, access is denied and allocation
fails. This process applies only when the List Of Group RACF option is active. If List Of Groups checking is inactive, only the current connect group is checked for access.

Note that:

• It is advisable to use the Global Access Table to store SMS classes which anyone may use.

• Revoked USERIDs should not be used as a resource owner – this causes RACF to fail the request.

• If you specify USE_RESOWNER=NO in the IGDSMSxx member, RACF uses the execution userid instead of the resource owner to check authorization. This allows users who do not use a naming convention, userid, or group as the HLQ of dataset names to check authorization to use storage and management classes. If USE_RESOWNER=YES is specified in the IGDSMSxx member, there is no change to current processing.

PROTECTING SMS DEFAULTS

If the intention is to use the SMS defaults in the ACS routines, they should be protected by RACF. To protect these defaults, RACF general resource profiles are defined in the FIELD class. FIELD level checking in RACF can be used to control access to the fields in the DFP segment. Members of the storage administration group should be able to update all fields in all DFP segments. Individual users should be able to list all fields in their own user and dataset profiles. The only field that they should be able to update is DATAACLAS in the user profile.

Control of the profiles in the FIELD class should remain with the security administrator. The storage administrator should not be given CLAUTH(FIELD) as the FIELD class contains not only profiles for the DFP segment, but also profiles for other segments unrelated to DFP, such as the TSO segment contained in user profiles.

To protect user defaults, use the following RDEFINE RACF command:

RDEFINE FIELD USER.DFP.dflt.name OWNER(res-owner) UACC(access authority)

where dflt-name is a SMS default name as follows:
• DATAAPPL
• DATACLAS
• STORCLAS
• MGMTCLAS

To protect the group defaults, use the following RDEFINE RACF command:

RDEFINE FIELD GROUP.DFP.dflt.name OWNER(res-owner) UACC(access authority)

If all users or groups require the same access, use a generic profile to cover all the fields in a DFP segment as follows:

RDEFINE FIELD USER.DFP.* OWNER(res-owner) UACC(access authority)
RDEFINE FIELD GROUP.DFP.* OWNER(res-owner) UACC(access authority)

The required PERMIT commands must be issued:

PERMIT USER.DFP.dflt-name CLASS(FIELD) ID(userid/group name) ACCESS(access-level)
PERMIT GROUP.DFP.dflt-name CLASS(FIELD) ID(userid/group name) ACCESS(access-level)

Note that UPDATE authority is sufficient to change a value in a field of the DFP segment.

To RACLIST the FIELD class, enter the following RACF command:

SETROPTS RACLIST(FIELD)

To activate the FIELD general resource CLASS, enter the following RACF command:

SETROPTS CLASSACT(FIELD)

To protect the RESOWNER field contained in the DFP segment of a dataset profile, a RACF general resource profile is defined in the FIELD CLASS as follows:

RDEFINE FIELD DATASET.DFP.RESOWNER OWNER(res-owner) UACC(access authority)
Resetting passwords

The application presented here was designed to assist our help desk to reset callers’ passwords. It was initially written to run under ISPF, but as the help desk spends a lot of time logged onto CICS (our e-mail package runs under this environment), it was ported to run there.

The application has been tested on a system running APPC, CICS/ESA Version 4, and RACF Version 2.4.

A number of hurdles had to be overcome when I ported the application:

- It’s not a good idea to run authorized code under CICS.
- It’s not recommended under CICS to allow your application to converse with the user.
- We couldn’t allow the application to perform any worse than under TSO/ISPF.

The application is initiated under CICS by the user entering transaction HDPW from the screen. Transaction HDPW ‘uses’ program HDUSER, which calls up BMS HDMAP to allow the user to enter the customer id and command. HDUSER verifies that all the fields on the screen are entered, based on a selected action; if not, it will loop round until it’s happy.

HDUSER then builds a commarea and links to program HDUSERI. HDUSERI allocates an LU6.2 connection and then initiates an APPC transaction. A conversation with this transaction is undertaken, and the results are stored in the commarea storage provided by HDUSER. Control is then passed back to HDUSER, which in turn displays the results from the HDUSERI call using HDMAP.

Note the following:

- By using an APPC scheduled transaction, I could call ‘authorized’ programs out of the CICS environment.
- Performance was guaranteed by using multi-scheduled transactions, rather than standard.
• I used a looping mechanism in HDUSER to make the user think he was conversing with the transaction.

VTAM

The following is the VTAM ACB source I used, created in member APPLHD;

```plaintext
VBUILD TYPE=APPL
HDLU62 APPL AGBNAME=HDLU62,
APPC=YES, AUTOSES=0,
DDRAINL=NALLOW, DLOGMOD=LU62SYS1,
DMINWNL=3,DMINWNR=6,
DRESPL=NALLOW, DSESLIM=9,
EAS=1, MODETAB=MODELU6,
PARSESS=YES, SECACPT=ALREADYV,
SRBEXIT=YES, VPACING=2
```

Note that the dlogmod and modetab were already set up for me, but you may have to create your own.

Vary the node active by using the following console command:

```
V NET,ACT,ID=APPLHD
```

ASCH

Listed below are the ASCH parameters I used. These are added to your SYS1.PARMLIB ASCHPMxx member.

```plaintext
CLASSADD
  CLASSNAME(MULTI)
  MAX(25)
  MIN(1)
  RESPGOAL(1)
  MSGLIMIT(12000)
  TPDEFAULT
  REGION(48M)
  TIME(1440)
```

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MSGLEVEL(1,1)
OUTCLASS(X)

To activate these new parms, issue the following console command:

T ASCH=xx

APPC

Listed below are the APPC parameters I used. These are added to your SYS1.PARMLIB APPCPMxx member;

LUADD
   ACBNAME(HDLU62)
   SCHED(ASCH)
   BASE
   TPDATA(BD.VOMVSZT.CSR.TPDATA.CLUSTER)
   TPLEVEL(SYSTEM)

In my case, the sideinfo dataset was previously defined; note that you may need to add your own sideinfo parameter.

You can use

T APPC=xx

to activate any changes made to the parmlib member.

Use the following IDCAMS define to create your TP dataset:

DEFINE CLUSTER
   -
   (NAME(BD.VOMVSZT.CSR.TPDATA.CLUSTER) -
   INDEXED REUSE -
   SHAREOPTIONS(3 3) -
   RECORDSIZE(3248 7024) -
   KEYS(112 Ø) -
   TRACKS(50) -
   VOLUME(SYSLO9))

Once the TP file is created, you’ll need to prime it with your TP data.

The following JCL adds a TPNAME of HDUSER, and inserts the required JCL to run the transaction under ASCH.

//BDCSRT JOB (,,IS),'CALUM',CLASS=A,MSGCLASS=X,
   NOTIFY=&SYSUID
//STEP0002 EXEC PGM=ATBSDFMU
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* 
//SYSSDOUT DD SYSOUT=*
CICS DEFINITIONS
The required CICS definitions for HDUSER are shown in Figures 1 to 4.

REXX EXECs
I’ve used two REXX execs, ZHDUSER and XHDUSER. The first is ‘wrapper’ code, which allows multi-scheduling. These execs are run from the ASCH-initiated JCL.
**Figure 1: CICS definitions for HDUSER**

- **Connection**
  - Connection: HD00
  - Group: HDUSER
  - Description: Connection used by HDUSER

- **CONNECTION IDENTIFIERS**
  - Netname: HDLU62
  - INDays: 

- **REMOTE ATTRIBUTES**
  - REMOTESYSTEM: 
  - REMOTENAME: 
  - REMOTESYSNet: 

- **REMOTE CONNECTION PROPERTIES**
  - Accessmethod: Vtam
  - Protocol: Appc
  - Conntype: 
  - Singleess: No
  - Datastream: User
  - RECordformat: U
  - Queuelimit: No
  - Maxqtime: No

- **OPERATIONAL PROPERTIES**
  - Autoconnect: Yes
  - INService: Yes

- **SECURITY**
  - Securityname: 
  - Attachsec: Local
  - BINDPassword: 
  - BINDSecurity: No
  - Usedfltuser: No

- **RECOVERY**
  - Psrecovery: Sysdefault

- **Mapset**
  - Group: HDUSER
  - Description: Mapset for HDUSER
  - Resident: No
  - USAGE: Normal
  - USElpacopy: No
  - Status: Enabled
  - Rsl: 00

- **PARTner**
  - Group: HDUSER
  - Description: TPNAME definition for HDUSER
  - REMOTE LU NAME
    - NETName: HDLU62
    - NETWork: 
  - SESSION PROPERTIES
    - Profile: DFHCICS
  - REMOTE TP NAME
    - TpName: HDUSER
    - Xtpname: 

**PROGram** : HDUSER
Group : HDUSER
Description : Main program
Language : Assembler
RELoad : No
RESIdent : No
USAge : Normal
USElpacopy : No
Status : Enabled
Rsl : 00
Cedf : Yes
Datalocation : Any
EXECKey : User
REMOTE ATTRIBUTES
REMOTE System : 
REMOTEName : 
Transid : 
EXECUtionset : Fullapi

**PROGram** : HDUSERI
Group : HDUSER
Description : LU62 comms program
Language : Assembler
RELoad : No
RESIdent : No
USAge : Normal
USElpacopy : No
Status : Enabled
Rsl : 00
Cedf : Yes
Datalocation : Any
EXECKey : User
REMOTE ATTRIBUTES
REMOTE System : 
REMOTEName : 
Transid : 
EXECUtionset : Fullapi

Figure 2: CICS definitions for HDUSER (continued)

**ZHDUSER**

ZHDUSER is the wrapper code.

```rexx
/* REXX
trace i */
cc = Ø

address tso "atbgtrn returnc"
cc = rc

if cc ≠ Ø then signal exit_point_zhduser
do forever
    call xhduser
```

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sessions</th>
<th>HD00SESS</th>
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<td>Group</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Session used by HDUSER</td>
</tr>
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<td>SESSION IDENTIFIERS</td>
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<td>RECOVNotify</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: CICS definitions for HDUSER (continued)**

```plaintext
address tso "atbgtrn returnc"
cc = rc

if cc ≠ 0 then leave
end

exit_point_zhduser:
exit cc

**XHDUSER**

XHDUSER is the main routine. It communicates with the CICS user who initiated the conversation, and also processes the RACF commands to reset user passwords.
/* REXX
trace e */

userid = copies(' ',8)
dummy_cc = copies('Ø',8)
numvars = 14
cc = Ø
yy = 19

recbuf = copies(' ',24)
reqlen = length(recbuf)

message = copies(' ',1978)
message_length = left('Ø7ba'x,2)
sndlen = length(message)

cvt = c2x(storage(1Ø,4))
ascb = c2x(storage(224,4))
asxb = c2x(Storage(D2x(X2d(ascb)+1Ø8),4))
acee = c2x(Storage(D2x(X2d(asxb)+2ØØ),4))

\Figure 4: CICS definitions for HDUSER (continued)\
calluser = Storage(D2x(X2d(acee)+21),8)
calltime = time()
calldate = date('e')

address cpicomm "cmaccp convid r_c"
if r_c > Ø then call error CMACCP r_c

address cpicomm ,
   "cmrcv convid recbuf reqlen datarec reclen status rtsr r_c"
if r_c > Ø then call error CMrRV r_c

parse var recbuf 1 length 3 action 9 userid2 17 newpass 25 .
userid = overlay(userid2,userid,1,8,' ')
say 'CallUser' calluser 'CallTime' calltime 'CallDate' calldate ,
   'CallType' action

select
   when (action = 'LIST')   then call action_list_user
   when (action = 'RESET')  then call action_reset_user
   when (action = 'RESUME') then call action_resume_user
   otherwise message = overlay('selection not available yet',message)
end
message = message_length||message
ptype = 3
address cpicomm "cmsst convid ptype r_c"
if r_c > Ø then call error CMSST r_c

sndbuf = message
address cpicomm "cmsend convid sndbuf sndlen rtsr r_c"
if r_c > Ø then call error CMSEND r_c

address cpicomm ,
   "cmrcv convid recbuf reqlen datarec reclen status rtsr r_c"
if (r_c > Ø) & (r_c = 18) then call error CMRCV r_c

exit Ø
error:nop
arg rtn retcode
errmsg = 'Error in 'rtn'; return code is 'retcode
message = overlay(errmsg,message)
address cpicomm "cmdeal convid r_c"
exit 8

action_list_user:
call get_storage

call set_parms

program = lmvuser1

call call_racf_program

call variable_tab

call retrieve_program_diags

if progrc *= dummy_cc then do
    message = overlay('Bad rc, check userid entered ok.',message)
    say 'Userid ' userid1
    say 'Progrc ' progrc
    say 'RACFRc ' racfrc
    say 'RACFRSN' racfrsn
    say 'SAFRc ' safrc
    say 'SAFRSN ' safrsn
    say 'SAFmsg ' safmsg
    signal action_list_user_end
end

offset = 56

do loop = 1 to numvars

    working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+offset)
    info_length = get_var(working_addr,4)
    info_length = c2d(info_length)
    offset = offset + 4
    working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+offset)
    varz.loop = get_var(working_addr,info_length)

    var_type = substr(var.loop,1,1)
    var_len  = substr(var.loop,2,2)
    var_flag = substr(var.loop,4,4)
    vart.loop = substr(c2x(varz.loop),1,var_len)

    select
        when (var_type = 'C') then,
            varz.loop = substr(varz.loop,1,var_len)
        when (var_type = 'F') then,
            varz.loop = substr(c2d(varz.loop),1,var_len)
        when (var_type = 'X') then,
            varz.loop = substr(c2x(varz.loop),1,var_len)
        otherwise nop
    end
select
  when (var_flag = 'no') then nop
  when (var_flag = 'grp') then dflt_group = varz.loop
  when (var_flag = 'flag') then do
    varx = varz.loop
    varz.loop = flag.varx
  end
  when (var_flag = 'date') then do
    if varz.loop = 'ØØØØØ' then,
      varz.loop = ''
    else,
      if varz.loop = 'FFFFF' then,
        varz.loop = ''
      else do
        cyy = substr(varz.loop,1,2)
        if cyy < 70 then yy = 20
        varz.loop = datex(j,e,yy||varz.loop)
      end
    end
  end
  otherwise nop
end

offset = offset + info_length
end
call build_screen
message = overlay(screen,message)
action_list_user_end:
call free_storage
return

retrieve_program_diags:
working_addr = c2x(addr)
userid1= get_var(working_addr,8)
working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+8)
progrc = get_var(working_addr,8)
working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+16)
racfrc = get_var(working_addr,8)
working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+24)
racfrsn= get_var(working_addr,8)
working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+32)
safrc  = get_var(working_addr,8)
working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+40)
safrsn = get_var(working_addr,8)

working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+48)
safmsg = get_var(working_addr,8)
return

get_storage:
command = get
addr = left('00000000'x,4)
length = 1024
address linkmvs "storage command addr length"
cc = rc
return

free_storage:
command = free
address linkmvs "storage command addr length"
return

get_var: return storage(arg(1),arg(2))

call_racf_program:
"tsoexec call 'bdmx.mnlodzsx.auth("program")'" ""addr" asis"
cc = rc
return

set_parms:
working_addr = c2x(addr)
save_var = storage(working_addr,8,userid)
working_addr = d2x(c2d(addr)+8)
save_var = storage(working_addr,8,dummy_cc)
return

get_var:
working_addr = arg(1)
len = arg(2)
getstor = storage(working_addr,len)
return getstor

variable_tab:
var.1 = 'C'||Ø8||'grp'||'Default connect group'
var.2 = 'C'||Ø2||'no'||'User's name'
var.3 = 'X'||Ø5||'date'||'Password last changed date'
var.4 = 'F'||Ø2||'no'||'Password change interval'
var.5 = 'X'||Ø5||'date'||'Last access date'
var.6 = 'X'||Ø4||'no'||'Last access time (hhmm)'
var.7 = 'X'||Ø2||'no'||'Number password attempts'
var.8 = 'X'||Ø2||'flag'||'Userid revoked'
var.9 = 'X'||Ø2||'flag'||'Auditor attributes'
var.10 = 'X'||Ø2||'flag'||'Operations attributes'
var.11 = 'X'||Ø2||'flag'||'Special attributes'
var.12 = 'X'||Ø2||'flag'||'Password not required'
var.13 = 'X'||Ø2||'flag'||'User being audited'
var.14 = 'C'||8Ø||'no '||'Installation data'
flag.ØØ = 'No'
flag.8Ø = 'Yes'
return

build_screen:
screen = copies(' ',78*numvars)
do loop = 1 to numvars
    z = loop - 1
    screen = overlay(vart.loop,screen,1+(z*78))
    screen = overlay(varz.loop,screen,29+(z*78))
end
return

action_resume_user:
on = outtrap("resumeu.",'*')
"alu" userid "resume"
cc = rc
ooff = outtrap("OFF")
if cc = Ø then,
    message = overlay('Resume for user id completed ok',message)
else,
    do loop = 1 to resumeu.Ø
        offset = (((loop-1)*8Ø)+1)
        message = overlay(resumeu.loop,message,offset)
    end
return

action_reset_user:
on = outtrap("resetu.",'')
"alu" userid "password("newpass")"
cc = rc
ooff = outtrap("OFF")
if cc = Ø then,
    message = overlay('Password reset for user id completed ok',message)
else,
    do loop = 1 to resetu.Ø
        offset = (((loop-1)*8Ø)+1)
message = overlay(resetu.loop,message,offset)
end
return

ASSEMBLER CODE
The following code is presented below:

• HDUSER, the main CICS program for the application.
• HDUSERI, LU6.2 communication.
• HDMAP, CICS BMS.
• LMVUSERI, which retrieves RACF information for userid.

HDCOMM and HDUSER
This code should be link’d Rmode ANY, Amode 31, and RENT.

HDCOMM
COMMAREA DSECT
RETURN_MESSAGE DS CL2000
  ORG RETURN_MESSAGE
ACTION DS CL6
USER_ID DS CL8
NEWPASS DS CL8
COMMDATA_L DS H
DATA_POS EQU *-COMMAREA
COMMDATA DS CL(L'RETURN_MESSAGE-DATA_POS)
  ORG ,
COMMAREA_LENGTH EQU *-COMMAREA
*

HDUSER
HDUSER   DFHEIENT CODEREG=(12),DATAREG=(13),EIBREG=(11)
  *
  MVC TRANS_.EIBTRNID
  *
  EXEC CICS HANDLE CONDITION MAPFAIL(SEND_MAP_SCRATCH)
  *
  EXEC CICS HANDLE AID PF3(DISPLAY_RESULTS_END)
  *
CHECK_FOR_INFORMATION_SCREEN EQU *
  EXEC CICS RECEIVE MAPSET('HDMAP') MAP('HDMAP')
  *
CHECK_FOR_USERID EQU *
   CLI IUSERIDO,C' '  
   BE GET_USERID  
   CLI IUSERIDO,X'ØØ'  
   BNE CHECK_FOR_COMMAND

*  
GET_USERID EQU *
   MVC IUSERIDL,=H'-1'  
   B SEND_MAP

*  
CHECK_FOR_COMMAND EQU *
   MVC USER_ID_,IUSERIDO 
   CLI ICOMMO,C' '  
   BE GET_COMMAND  
   CLI ICOMMO,X'ØØ'  
   BNE CHECK_COMMAND_TYPE

*  
GET_COMMAND EQU *
   MVC ICOMML,=H'-1'  
   B SEND_MAP

*  
CHECK_COMMAND_TYPE EQU *
   CLI ICOMMO,C'L'  
   BE SETUP_LIST

*  
   CLI ICOMMO,C'R'  
   BE SETUP_RESUME

*  
   CLI ICOMMO,C'P'  
   BE CHECK_FOR_NEWPASS

*  
   MVI ICOMMO,C' '  
   MVC ICOMML,=H'-1'  
   B SEND_MAP

*  
CHECK_FOR_NEWPASS EQU *
   CLI INEWPASO,C' '  
   BE GET_NEWPASS  
   CLI INEWPASO,X'ØØ'  
   BNE CHECK_FOR_CONFIRM

*  
GET_NEWPASS EQU *
   MVC INEWPASL,=H'-1'  
   B SEND_MAP

*  
CHECK_FOR_CONFIRM EQU *
   CLI ICONFO,C' '  
   BE GET_CONFIRM  
   CLI ICONFO,X'ØØ'  
   BNE X_CHECK_PASSWORDS

*
GET_CONFIRM EQU *
  MVC ICONFL,=H'-1'  
  B SEND_MAP
*

X_CHECK_PASSWORDS EQU *
  CLC INEWPASO,ICONFO
  BE SETUP_RESET
  MVC ICONFL,=H'-1'
  MVI ICONFO,' '
  MVC ICONFO+1(L'ICONFO-1),ICONFO
  B SEND_MAP
*

SETUP_RESET EQU *
  MVC ACTION_,=CL8'RESET'
  MVC NEWPASS_,INEWPASO
  B CALL_HDUSERI
*

SETUP_LIST EQU *
  MVC ACTION_,=CL8'LIST'
  B CALL_HDUSERI
*

SETUP_RESUME EQU *
  MVC ACTION_,=CL8'RESUME'
*

CALL_HDUSERI EQU *
  EXEC CICS GETMAIN SET(4) FLENGTH(=A(COMMAREA_LENGTH)) X
  INITIMG(ZERO)
  USING COMMAREA,4
  ST 4,SAVE_COMMAREA_PTR
  MVC ACTION,ACTION_
  MVC USER_ID,USER_ID_
  MVC NEWPASS,NEWPASS_
*

L 1,=A(COMMAREA_LENGTH)
STH 1,COMMAREA_H
  EXEC CICS LINK PROGRAM('HDUSERI') COMMAREA(COMMAREA) X
  LENGTH(COMMAREA_H)
*

  MVC ILINE10,COMMDATA
  MVC ILINE20,COMMDATA+L'ILINE10'
  MVC ILINE30,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*2)
  MVC ILINE40,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*3)
  MVC ILINE50,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*4)
  MVC ILINE60,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*5)
  MVC ILINE70,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*6)
  MVC ILINE80,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*7)
  MVC ILINE90,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*8)
  MVC ILINE100,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*9)
  MVC ILINE110,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*10)
  MVC ILINE120,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*11)
  MVC ILINE130,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*12)
MVC ILINE140,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE1O*13)
MVC ILINE150,COMMDATA+(L'ILINE10*14)

FREE_COMMAREA EQU *
  L 4,SAVE_COMMAREA_PTR
  EXEC CICS FREEMAIN DATAPointer(4)
  MVC ICOMML,=H'-1'
  MVI ICOMMO,C'
  MVI ICONFO,C'
  MVC ICONFO+1(L'ICONFO-1),ICONFO
  MVI INEWPASO,C'
  MVC INEWPASO+1(L'INEWPASO-1),INEWPASO

SEND_MAP EQU *
  EXEC CICS SEND MAPSET('HDMAP') MAP('HDMAP') FREEKB X CURSOR
  B CALL_TRANS

SEND_MAP_SCRATCH EQU *
  EXEC CICS SEND MAPSET('HDMAP') MAP('HDMAP') ERASE X MAPONLY

CALL_TRANS EQU *
  EXEC CICS RETURN TRANsID(TRANS_)

DISPLAY_RESULTS_END EQU *
  MVC SEND_MESSAGE,END_OF_DIALOG

OUTPUT_TO_TERMINAL EQU *
  EXEC CICS SEND CONTROL ERASE
  EXEC CICS SEND FROM(SEND_MESSAGE)

EXIT_POINT DS ØH
  EXEC CICS RETURN

START_OF_LITERALS DC CL8'########'

ZERO DC X'ØØ'
END_OF_DIALOG DC CL(L'SEND_MESSAGE')'.HDPW COMPLETED'
ERROR_FROM_HDUSERI DC CL(L'SEND_MESSAGE')'.HDPW INVALID USERID, PLEASE CK
HECK AND RE-ENTER'

LTORG ,

END_OF_LITERALS DC CL8'########'

DFHEISTG
DATA_LENGTH DS H
SAVE_COMMAREA_PTR DS F
STATE_CHECK DS F

HDUSERI

The HDUSERI code should be link’d Rmode ANY, Amode 31, and RENT.

HDUSERI

HDUSERI  DFHEIENT CODEREG=(12),DATAREG=(13),EIBREG=(11)

*   USING COMMAREA,2
  L  2,DFHEICAP
  LTR 2,2
  BZ EXIT_POINT

*   EXEC CICS GDS ALLOCATE SYSID(CONNECTION)  X
     STATE(STATE_CHECK)  X
     CONVID(CONVERSATION_ID)  X
     RETCODE(RETURN_CODE)  X
     CLC =F'Ø',RETURN_CODE
     BE STARTUP_PARTNER
     MVC COMMDATA(L'ERROR_GDS_ALLOCATE),ERROR_GDS_ALLOCATE
     B  EXIT_POINT

*   STARTUP_PARTNER EQU *
   EXEC CICS GDS CONNECT PROCESS CONVID(CONVERSATION_ID)  X
     CONVDATA(CONVERSATION_DATA)  X
     STATE(STATE_CHECK)  X
     PARTNER(HD_PARTNER)  X
     SYNLEVEL(Ø)  X
     RETCODE(RETURN_CODE)  X
     CLC =F'Ø',RETURN_CODE
BE  SEND_MESSAGE_TO_PARTNER
MVC  COMMDATA(L'ERROR_CONNECT_PROCESS),ERROR_CONNECT_PROCESS
B  EXIT_POINT
*
SEND_MESSAGE_TO_PARTNER EQU *
MVC  ACTION_.ACTION
MVC  USERID_.USER_ID
MVC  NEWPASS_.NEWPASS
LA  1,L'SEND_MESSAGE+L'SEND_MESSAGE_HEADER
STH  1,SEND_MESSAGE_HEADER
ST  1,SEND_MESSAGE_LENGTH
EXEC  CICS  GDS  SEND  CONVID(CONVERSATION_ID)  X
  CONVDATA(CONVERSATION_DATA)  X
  STATE(STATE_CHECK)  WAIT  INVITE  X
  FROM(SEND_MESSAGE_HEADER)  FLENGTH(SEND_MESSAGE_LENGTH)  X
  RETCODE(RETURN_CODE)
CLC  =F'Ø',RETURN_CODE
BE  RECEIVE_MESSAGE_FROM_PARTNER
MVC  COMMDATA(L'ERROR_SEND_MESSAGE_START),ERROR_SEND_MESSAGE_X
    START
B  EXIT_POINT
*
RECEIVE_MESSAGE_FROM_PARTNER EQU *
L  1,=A(L'COMMDATA+1Ø)
ST  1,SEND_MESSAGE_LENGTH
EXEC  CICS  GDS  RECEIVE  CONVID(CONVERSATION_ID)  X
  CONVDATA(CONVERSATION_DATA)  X
  STATE(STATE_CHECK)  BUFFER  X
  INTO(COMMDATA_L)  FLENGTH(SEND_MESSAGE_LENGTH)  X
  MAXFLENGTH(SEND_MESSAGE_LENGTH)  X
  RETCODE(RETURN_CODE)
CLC  =F'Ø',RETURN_CODE
BE  CLOSE_CONNECTION
MVC  COMMDATA(L'ERROR_RECEIVE_MESSAGE_1),ERROR_RECEIVE_MESSAGE_X
    E_1
B  EXIT_POINT
*
CLOSE_CONNECTION EQU *
EXEC  CICS  GDS  SEND  CONVID(CONVERSATION_ID)  X
  CONVDATA(CONVERSATION_DATA)  X
  STATE(STATE_CHECK)  X
  LAST  WAIT  X
  RETCODE(RETURN_CODE)
*
FREE_CONNECTION EQU *
EXEC  CICS  GDS  FREE  CONVID(CONVERSATION_ID)  X
  STATE(STATE_CHECK)  X
  CONVDATA(CONVERSATION_DATA)  X
  RETCODE(RETURN_CODE)
*
EXIT_POINT DS ØH
   EXEC CICS RETURN
*
STATE_CHECK_VALUE EQU *
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(ALLOCATED)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(CONFFREE)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(CONFRECEIVE)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(CONFSEND)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(FREE)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(PENDFREE)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(PENDRECEIVE)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(RECEIVE)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(SEND)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(SYNCFREE)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(SYNCRECEIVE)
   CLC STATE_CHECK,DFHVALUE(SYNCSEND)
STATE_CHECK_VALUE_END EQU *
*
MOVE_CHAR MVC Ø(Ø,4),USER_ID
*
START_OF_LITERALS DC CL8'########'
*
ERROR_GDS_ALLOCATE DC C'ERROR ALLOCATING LU62 CONNECTION.'
ERROR_CONNECT_PROCESS DC C'ERROR TRYING TO START TRIGGER PROCESS.'
ERROR_SEND_MESSAGE_START DC C'ERROR SENDING FIRST MESSAGE.'
ERROR_RECEIVE_MESSAGE_1 DC C'ERROR RECEIVING FIRST MESSAGE.'
ERROR_RECEIVE_MESSAGE_2 DC C'ERROR RECEIVING SECOND MESSAGE.'
*
HD_PARTNER DC CL8'HDUSER'
CONNECTION DC CL4'HDØØ'
   LTORG .
*
END_OF_LITERALS DC CL8'########'
*
*
DFHEISTG
CONVERSATION_ID DS CL4
CONVERSATION_DATA DS CL24
DATA_LENGTH DS F
   DS ØF
RETURN_CODE DS CL6
   DS ØF
SEND_MESSAGE_HEADER DS H
SEND_MESSAGE DS CL22
   ORG SEND_MESSAGE
ACTION_ DS CL6
USERID_ DS CL8
NEWPASS_ DS CL8
   ORG .
HDMAP

This code should be link’d Rmode ANY, Amode 31.

```assembly
SEND_MESSAGE_LENGTH DS F
STATE_CHECK DS F
END_OF_DFHEISTG DS CL8

* COPY HDCOMM
*
ORG ,
END

PRINT ON,NOGEN
HDMAP DFHMSD TYPE=MAP,LANG=ASM,MODE=INOUT,SUFFIX=
   TITLE 'BMS: HDMAP
   HDMAP

HDMAP DFHMDI SIZE=(24,8Ø),CTRL=(PRINT,FREEKB),COLUMN=SAME,LINE=NEXT,*
   DATA=FIELD,TIOAPFX=YES,OBFMT=NO
   DFHMDF POS=(1,1),LENGTH=5,INITIAL='+HDPW',ATTRB=(PROT,BRT)
   DFHMDF POS=(1,7),LENGTH=2Ø,INITIAL='Customer''s RACF id :', *
      ATTRB=(PROT,NORM)
* IUSERID IUSERID
   DFHMDF POS=(1,28),LENGTH=8,JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK),ATTRB=(UNPROT,*
      BRT,IC,FSET)
   DFHMDF POS=(1,37),LENGTH=13,INITIAL='    Command :', *
      ATTRB=(PROT,NORM)
* ICOMM ICOMM
   DFHMDF POS=(1,52),LENGTH=1,JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK),ATTRB=(UNPROT,*
      BRT,FSET)
   DFHMDF POS=(1,54),LENGTH=22,INITIAL=' P for Password reset', *
      ATTRB=(PROT,NORM)
   DFHMDF POS=(2,56),LENGTH=12,INITIAL='R for Resume', *
      ATTRB=(PROT,NORM)
   DFHMDF POS=(3,56),LENGTH=1Ø,INITIAL='L for List',ATTRB=(PROT,N*
      ORM)
   DFHMDF POS=(5,1),LENGTH=14,INITIAL='New password :', *
      ATTRB=(PROT,NORM)
* INEWPAS INEWPAS
   DFHMDF POS=(5,16),LENGTH=8,JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK),ATTRB=(UNPROT,*
      BRT,FSET)
   DFHMDF POS=(5,25),LENGTH=19,INITIAL=' Confirm password :'. *
      ATTRB=(PROT,NORM)
* ICONF ICONF
   DFHMDF POS=(5,45),LENGTH=8,JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK),ATTRB=(UNPROT,*
      DRK,FSET)
   DFHMDF POS=(5,54),LENGTH=Ø,ATTRB=(PROT,NORM)
* ILINE1 ILINE1
   DFHMDF POS=(7,1),LENGTH=78,JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK),ATTRB=(UNPROT.*
      NORM)
   DFHMDF POS=(7,8Ø),LENGTH=Ø,ATTRB=(PROT,NORM)
```

* ILINE2
ILINE2   DFHMDF POS=(8,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE2   DFHMDF POS=(8,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE3
ILINE3   DFHMDF POS=(9,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE3   DFHMDF POS=(9,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE4
ILINE4   DFHMDF POS=(10,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE4   DFHMDF POS=(10,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE5
ILINE5   DFHMDF POS=(11,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE5   DFHMDF POS=(11,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE6
ILINE6   DFHMDF POS=(12,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE6   DFHMDF POS=(12,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE7
ILINE7   DFHMDF POS=(13,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE7   DFHMDF POS=(13,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE8
ILINE8   DFHMDF POS=(14,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE8   DFHMDF POS=(14,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE9
ILINE9   DFHMDF POS=(15,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE9   DFHMDF POS=(15,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE10
ILINE10 DFHMDF POS=(16,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE10 DFHMDF POS=(16,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE11
ILINE11 DFHMDF POS=(17,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE11 DFHMDF POS=(17,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE12
ILINE12 DFHMDF POS=(18,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE12 DFHMDF POS=(18,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE13
ILINE13 DFHMDF POS=(19,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
ILINE13 DFHMDF POS=(19,8Ø), LENGTH=Ø, ATTRB=(PROT, NORM)
* ILINE14
ILINE14 DFHMDF POS=(20,1), LENGTH=78, JUSTIFY=(LEFT,BLANK), ATTRB=(UNPROT, NORM)
LMVUSERI

This code should be link’d Rmode ANY, Amode 31, and AC=1.

LMVUSERI should be placed in an APF authorized library. An entry should also be placed in SYS1.PARMLIB member IKJTSOxx, under AUTHPGM. This allows the authorized code to be called within a TSO environment.

```
LMVUSERI AMODE 31
LMVUSERI RMODE ANY
LMVUSERI CSECT
DS 0H
B BEGIN-LMVUSERI(,15)
DC C'LMVUSERI: '
DC C'&SYSDATE &SYSTIME'
DS 0H
BEGIN EQU *
BAKR 14,0
LR 12,15
LR 10,1
USING LMVUSERI,12
USING WORKAREA,11
*
START EQU *
L 2,=A(WORK_AREA_LENGTH)
STORAGE OBTAIN,LENGTH=(2)
LR 11,1
ST 11,GETMAIN_ADDRESS
LA 13,SAVEAREA
MVC SAVEAREA+4(4),=C'F1SA'
MVC DSS_EYE,=CL8'LMVUSERI'
MVC RACROUTE(CHECLEN),RAC_CHEK
LR 1,1Ø SAVE FOR DUMP
L 10,0(,10)
```
LR 2,10          SAVE FOR DUMP
LH 9,Ø(,10)
L 10,2(,10)

*    ST 10,WORKS
    LA 15,CONVERT1
    BALR 14,15
    MVC WTO_DYN,WTO_STAT
    MVC DYN_MSG,STAT_MSG
    MVC DYN_MSG+13(8),WORK_VAR+Ø
    L 2,=A(STAT_MSG_LEN)
    STH 2,WTO_PARM
    LA 2,WTO_PARM
    WTO TEXT=((2)),MF=(E,WTO_DYN)
    *
    *    DC F'Ø'            FORCE ABENDØC1
    *
    USING USERD_DSECT,10
    USING SAFP,6
    MVC RACFPARM,USERD_ID
    MVC ENTITY_1,'H'8'
    LA 7,RACROUTE_WORK
    LA 6,RACROUTEØ
    *
    SET_AUTH_ON EQU *
    MVC DYN_MODE_PROB,LIST_MODE_PROB
    MVC DYN_MODE_SUP,LIST_MODE_SUP
    MODESET ,MF=(E,DYN_MODE_SUP)
    *
    RACF_CALL EQU *
    RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,WORKA=(7),RELEASE=1.9,
    TYPE=EXTRACT,
    ENTITYX=ENTITY_1,
    FIELDS=FIELD_LISTØ,
    MF=(E,RACROUTEØ)
    LR 4,1
    LR 5,15
    LTR 15,15
    BNZ SET_AUTH_OFF
    USING EXTWKEA,4
    LR 3,4
    AH 3,EXTWOFF
    MVC USERD_DATA+Ø(1),='C'
    MVC USERD_DATA+1(L'USERD_DATA-1),USERD_DATA
    MVC USERD_DATA,Ø(3)
    *
    CLEANUP EQU *
    SR 2,2
    SR 3,3
    ICM 2,B'Ø11I',EXTWLN
    ICM 3,B'Ø001I',EXTWSP
DROP 4
STORAGE RELEASE,ADDR=(4),LENGTH=(2),SP=(3)
*
SET_AUTH_OFF EQU *
    MODESET ,MF=(E,DYN_MODE_PROB)
*
SAVE_DATA EQU *
    MVC WORKS,SAFPRRET
    LA 15,CONVERT1
    BALR 14,15
    MVC USERD_RACF_RSN,WORK_VAR+Ø
    MVC WORKS,SAFPRREA
    LA 15,CONVERT1
    BALR 14,15
    MVC USERD_RACF_RC,WORK_VAR+Ø
    MVC WORKS,SAFPSFRC
    LA 15,CONVERT1
    BALR 14,15
    MVC USERD_SAF_RC,WORK_VAR+Ø
    MVC WORKS,SAFPSFRS
    LA 15,CONVERT1
    BALR 14,15
    MVC USERD_SAF_RSN,WORK_VAR+Ø
    MVC WORKS,SAFPMSAD
    LA 15,CONVERT1
    BALR 14,15
    MVC USERD_SAF_RSN,WORK_VAR+Ø
    MVC WORKS,SAFPRREA
    LA 15,CONVERT1
    BALR 14,15
    MVC USERD_MSGAD,WORK_VAR+Ø
    MVC USERD_SAFP,Ø(7)
*
SAVE_RETURN_CODE EQU *
    ST 5,WORKS
    LA 15,CONVERT1
    BALR 14,15
    MVC USERD_RC+Ø(L'USERD_RC),WORK_VAR+Ø
*
ENDIT EQU *
    L 2,=A(WORK_AREA_LENGTH)
    L 3,GETMAIN_ADDRESS
    STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=(2),ADDR=(3)
    SR 15,15
    PR ,
*
*
CONVERT1 EQU *
    UNPK WORK_VAR(9),WORKS(5)
    MVZ WORK_VAR,=XL8'ØØ'
    TR WORK_VAR,TABLE
    XC WORKS,WORKS
    BR 14
*
TABLE DC C'Ø123456789ABCDEF'
*WTO_STAT WTO TEXT=,MF=L
WTO_STAT_LEN EQU *-WTO_STAT
STAT_MSG DC C'PARM ADDRESS XXXXXXXX'
STAT_MSG_LEN EQU *-STAT_MSG
*
LIST_MODE_SUP MODESET MODE= SUP,KEY=ZERO,MF=L
LIST_MODE_PROB MODESET MODE= PROB,KEY= NZERO,MF=L
*
RAC_CHEK RACROUTE REQUEST= EXTRACT,WORKA= ***,RELEASE= 1.9, TYPE= EXTRACT, CLASS= 'USER', ENTITYX= ***, FIELDS= ***, SEGMENT= 'BASE', MF= L
CHECØ_LEN EQU *-RAC_CHEK
*
FIELD_LISTØ DC A(14)
   DC CL8'DFLTGRP'
   DC CL8'PGMRNAME'
   DC CL8'PASSDATE'
   DC CL8'PASSINT'
   DC CL8'ljDATE'
   DC CL8'ljTIME'
   DC CL8'REVOKECT'
   DC CL8'FLAG4'
   DC CL8'FLAG6'
   DC CL8'FLAG3'
   DC CL8'FLAG2'
   DC CL8'FLAG7'
   DC CL8'UAUDIT'
   DC CL8'INSTDATA'
*
WORKAREA DSECT
SAVEAREA DS 18F
GETMAIN_ADDRESS DS F
DSS_EYE DS CL8
ENTITY_1 DS H
ENTITY_2 DS H
RACFPARM DS CL8
WORKS DS CL4,C
WORK_VAR DS CL8,C
*
RACROUTE_WORK DS CL512
   DS 0F
RACROUTØ DS CL(CHECØ_LEN)
*
   DS 0F
DYN_MODE_PROB DS CL(L'LIST_MODE_PROB)
   DS 0F
RACF

I’ve used the “new” FACILITY class profile IRR.PASSWORD.RESET to allow help desk personnel to issue ALU userid PASSWORD and ALU userid RESUME commands. I’ve added the help desk RACF group to the access list with UPDATE access. This still means that they can’t ALU ids with special, operations, or auditor attributes, and I’ve inserted a note in HDMAP to remind them of this. To allow them to list ANY userid, I’ve had to use my own code (LMVUSERI), rather than use the LU command.

I’ve also created a profile in TCICSTRN, called HDPW, to protect the HDPW transaction. I’ve added the same help desk group to the access list.

SCREEN SHOTS

The following shows the result after the list command has been entered.
+HDPW Customer's RACF id : SL452A     Command :  P for Password reset

R for Resume

L for List

New password :  Confirm password :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Default connect group</th>
<th>HOSYSGC1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>User's name</td>
<td>C REID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Password last changed date</td>
<td>23/03/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Password change interval</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last access date</td>
<td>06/04/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last access time (hhmm)</td>
<td>1416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number password attempts</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Userid revoked</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor attributes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations attributes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special attributes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Password not required</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User being audited</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cmds P+R unavailable for ids with Special, Operations or Auditor attributes
Pfkeys : PF3=End

Calum Reid
Systems Programmer (UK) © Xephon 2000

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**Code from *RACF Update* articles**

As a free service to subscribers and to remove the need to rekey the scripts, code from individual articles of *RACF Update* can be accessed on our Web site, at


You will need the user-id shown on your address label.
Using ICHRCX02 after PROTECT ALL – revisited

This article is an update to ‘Using ICHRCX02 after PROTECT ALL’, which appeared in Issue 14 of RACF Update (November 1998).

The exit ICHRCX02 as coded in the November 1998 article was intended as a tool to allow systems programmers access to unprotected RACF resources (such as external/vendor tapes) once PROTECTALL had been turned on in RACF. However, the fact that the list of individuals that are allowed access is hard-coded into the ICHRCX02 program can create problems – ICHRCX02 is loaded by RACF during IPL and is only refreshable via IPL (or by using an OEM LPA module replace/refresh functional product such as TMON, which will also refresh the RACF exit address pointer). This is problematic for a shop that needs both continued OS/390 availability and the ability to change the access list.

ICHRCX02 has therefore been modified as follows:

- The access list has been removed and assembled/link-edited into its own module, ICHRCXTB in SYS1.LINKLIB.
- ICHRCX02 has been changed to do a LOAD on the ICHRCXTB module and use the returned entry point as the starting point for the access list.
- The rest of the ICHRCX02 program, once the userid in the ACEE has been validated against the access list, remains basically the same.

Now, in order to change the access list, you simply need to alter the source to ICHRCXTB, assemble and link-edit it into SYS1.LINKLIB, and refresh the LLA.

ICHRCX02

//ICHRCX02 JOB (1Ø231Ø),'CSH ICHRCTØ2',CLASS=1,MSGCLASS=H, // MSGLEVEL=(1,1),NOTIFY=&SYSUID,TIME=144Ø,REGION=8M //*/

AUTHOR: JACK HWANG  CSHWANG@HOTMAIL.COM
 MODIFIED: JACK HWANG  12/14/99
 USE EXTERNAL TABLE ICHRCXTB
 OBJECTIVE: ALLOW SYSTEMS PROGS TO READ ANY TAPE DATASET
 RESOURCE THAT HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED. THIS WILL
 PROVIDE FOR PRODUCT TAPES WITH MISC DATA SET
 NAMES.

 MODULE : ICHRCX02, RE-ENTRANT, AUTHORIZED
 RACF RACHECK POST PROCESSING EXIT
 USED TO MODIFY STANDARD TAPEDSN PROCESSING TO PERMIT TECH
 SUPPORT READ ACCESS TO TAPE UNDEFINED RESOURCE.

 ASM EXEC PGM=ASMA90,PARM='OBJECT,XREF(SHORT),RENT'
 SYSLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.MACLIB
 // DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.MODGEN
 //SYSUT1 DD UNIT=SYSALLDA,SPACE=(CYL,(10,5)),DSN=&SYSUT1
 //SYSPUNCH DD DUMMY
 //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
 //SYSLIN DD DISP=(,PASS),UNIT=SYSALLDA,SPACE=(CYL,(5,5,0)),
 //DCB=(BLKSIZE=400),DSN=&LOADSET
 //SYSIN DD *
 TITLE 'ICHRCX02 RACHECK POST PROCESSING EXIT   CSH &SYSDATE'
 *
 * REGISTER USAGE
 *
 *********  CHORNG S. (JACK) HWANG 6/1/98
    HSA SYSTEMS INC
    CSHWANG@HOTMAIL.COM
 *
 *
 * R1  - WORK
 * R2  - WORK
 * R3  - WORK
 * R4  - WORK
 * R5  - ACEE ADDRESS
 * R6  - WORK
 * R6  - WORK
 * R10 - BASE FOR RCXPL
 * R11 - BASE FOR WT0
 * R12 - BASE FOR CODE
 *
 ICHRCX02 CSECT
 STM  14,12,12(13)
 LR   12,15
USING ICHRCXØ2,12
LR 1Ø,1    SAVE ADDRESS OF RCXPL
USING RCXPL,10    ADDRESS RCXPL

* L 1,RCXRCODE    GET ADDRESS OF RETURN CODE
CLC 2(2,1),=H'4'    RESOURCE NOT DEFINED?
BE RCOK    YES, CONTINUE PROCESSING
CLC 2(2,1),=H'8'    ACCESS VIOLATION?
BE RCOK    YES, CONTINUE PROCESSING
B EXIT    NEITHER, EXIT

* RCOK DS ØH
USING PSA,Ø    ADDR PSA
L 1,PSAAOLD    GET ASCB ADDRESS
USING ASCB,1    ADDR ASCB
L 1,ASCBASXB    GET ASXB ADDRESS
USING ASXB,1    ADDR ASXB
L 5,ASXBSENV    GET ACEE ADDRESS
GETMAIN RU,LV=LOADLL    ACQ LOAD LIST AREA
LR 4,1    ACQUIRED ADDR
LOAD EP=ICHRCXTB,SF=(E,(4))    LOAD TECH USER TABLE ADDR
LR 2,Ø    SAVE LOADED ADDRESS
LR 7,15    SAVE RETURN CODE
FREEMAIN R,LV=LOADLL,A=(4)
LTR 7,7    TEST LOAD RETURN CODE
BNZ EXIT    NOT LOADED, FREEMAIN
USERIDLP DS ØH
CLI Ø(2),X'Ø7'    TEST LENGTH
BH EXIT    END REACHED - EXIT
XR 3,3    CLEAR R3
IC 3,Ø(2)    GET LENGTH
EX 3,CLCUID    COMPARE UID
USING ACEE,5    ADDR ACEE
*CLCUID CLC 1Ø(2),ACEEUSRI    COMPARE UID
BE IDOK    ID IS OK, CONTINUE
LA 2,2(3,2)    GO TO NEXT ENTRY
B USERIDLP
CLCUID CLC 1Ø(2),ACEEUSRI    COMPARE UID
DROP 1
* IDOK DS ØH
 *
* TEST FOR RESOURCE NOT DEFINED
 *
L 1,RCXRCODE    GET ADDRESS OF RETURN CODE
CLC 2(2,1),=H'4'    RESOURCE NOT DEFINED?
BNE TESTTAPE    NO, GO CHECK FOR TAPE DATASET
*

B CONTINUE CONTINUE WITH PROCESSING
*
* TEST FOR TAPE DSN
*
TESTTAPE DS ØH
L 1,RCXRCODE GET ADDRESS OF RETURN CODE
   CLC 2(2,1),=H'8' NOT AUTH?
BNE EXIT NO, EXIT EXIT
L 1,RCXFLAG3 GET FLAG3 ADDRESS
TM Ø(1),RCXDTYPT DSTYPE=T?
BNE EXIT NO, EXIT
L 1,RCXFLAG GET FLAG3 ADDRESS
TM Ø(1),RCXLGNOS LOG=NOFAIL OR NOLOG?
BZ CONTINUE NO, CONTINUE
L 1,RCXFLAG2 GET FLAG2 ADDRESS
TM Ø(1),RCXATTAL ALTER ATTEMPT?
BO CONTINUE NO, CONTINUE
B EXIT
CONTINUE DS ØH
*
GETMAIN RU,LV=WTOL GET WORKAREA
LR 11,1 SAVE WTO WORKAREA ADDRESS
MVC Ø(WTOL,11),WTO MOVE WTO MESSAGE
L 1,PSAAOLD GET ASCB ADDRESS
USING ASCB,1 ADDR ASCB
L 1,ASCBASXB GET ASXB ADDRESS
USING ASXB,1 ADDR ASXB
L 1,ASXBSENV GET ACEE ADDRESS
USING ACEE,1 ADDR ACEE
MVC 13(8,11),ACEEUSRI MOVE USERID INTO WTO
DROP 1 CLEAR ADDRESSING
L 1,RCXENORP GET PROFILE ADDRESS
MVC 41(44,11),Ø(1) MOVE PROFILE
L 1,RCXRCODE GET ADDRESS OF RETURN CODE
*
CLC 2(2,1),=H'4' RESOURCE NOT DEFINED?
BNE TAPEDSN NO, GO MOVE TAPE DSN REQUESTS
MVC 22(18,11),=CL18'SECURITY BYPASS ON'
B DOWTO GO DO WTO
*
TAPEDSN DS ØH
L 1,RCXFLAG2 GET FLAG2 ADDRESS
TM Ø(1),RCXATTRE READ ATTEMPTED?
BNE NEXT1 NO, NEXT 1
MVC 22(7,11),=CL7'READ' SPECIFY READ
B DOACCAL
NEXT1 DS ØH
TM Ø(1),RCXATTUP UPDATE ATTEMPTED?
BNO  NEXT2       NO, NEXT 1
MVC 22(7,11),=CL7'UPDATE' SPECIFY UPDATE
B DOACCAL
NEXT2 DS ØH
TM Ø(1),RCXATTCO CONTROL ATTEMPTED?
BNO NEXT3 NO, NEXT 1
MVC 22(7,11),=CL7'CONTROL' SPECIFY CONTROL
B DOACCAL
NEXT3 DS ØH
MVC 22(7,11),=CL7'ALTER' SPECIFY ALTER
DOACCAL DS ØH
L 1,RCXACC GET ACCESS ALLOWED FLAG
TM Ø(1),RCXNONE NONE ALLOWED?
BNO ANEXTØ NO, NEXT 1
MVC 3Ø(7,11),=CL7'NONE' SPECIFY NONE
B DOWTO
ANEXTØ DS ØH
TM Ø(1),RCXREAD READ ALLOWED?
BNO ANEXT1 NO, NEXT 1
MVC 3Ø(7,11),=CL7'READ' SPECIFY READ
B DOWTO
ANEXT1 DS ØH
TM Ø(1),RCXUPDAT UPDATE ALLOWED?
BNO ANEXT2 NO, NEXT 1
MVC 3Ø(7,11),=CL7'UPDATE' SPECIFY UPDATE
B DOWTO
ANEXT2 DS ØH
TM Ø(1),RCXCONTR CONTROL ALLOWED?
BNO ANEXT3 NO, NEXT 1
MVC 3Ø(7,11),=CL7'CONTROL' SPECIFY CONTROL
B DOWTO
ANEXT3 DS ØH
MVC 3Ø(7,11),=CL7'ALTER' ALTER - THIS SHOULD NEVER HAPPEN
DOWTO DS ØH
L 1,RCXXCODE GET ADDRESS OF RETURN CODE
XC Ø(4,1),Ø(1) SET RETURN CODE TO Ø
WTO MF=(E,(11)) DO THE WTO
FREEMAIN DS ØH
FREEMAIN R,LV=WTOL,A=(11)
*
EXIT DS ØH
LM 14,12,12(13)
SR 15,15
BR 14
*
WTO WTO 'ICHRCXØ2 UUUUUUUU AAAAAAA/ZZZZZZZ ON
PPPPPPPPPPQQQQQQQOQRRRRRX
ICHRCXTB

//ICHRCXTB JOB (1023310), 'CSH ICHRCXTB', CLASS=1, MSGCLASS=H,
// MSGLEVEL=(1,1), NOTIFY=&SYSUID, TIME=1440, REGION=8M
//*
*********************************************************************
//**  AUTHOR:    JACK HWANG                                          **
//**  OBJECTIVE:  TABLE USED BY ICHRCX02 TO CHECK FOR VALID IDS      **
*********************************************************************
//*
ASM    EXEC PGM=ASMA90, PARM='OBJECT,XREF(SHORT),RENT'
//SYSLIB   DD DISP=SHR, DSN=SYS1.MACLIB
//         DD DISP=SHR, DSN=SYS1.MODGEN
//SYSUT1   DD UNIT=SYSALLDA, SPACE=(CYL,(10,5)), DSN=&SYSUT1
//SYSPUNCH DD DUMMY
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=* 
//SYSLMOD DD DISP=SHR, DSN=SYS1.LINKLIB(ICHRCX02)

TITLE 'ICHRCX02 RACHECK POST PROCESSING EXIT TABLE CSH &SYSDATE'
* 
* REGISTER USAGE 
* 
****** CHORNG S. (JACK) HWANG 6/1/98
* HSA SYSTEMS INC
* CSHWANG@HOTMAIL.COM
*
Free weekly news by e-mail

Xephon has four weekly news services covering the following subject areas:

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Information point – reviews

Where else might you go to supplement the kind of information you find in each issue of *RACF Update*? This on-going series of articles explores some of those sources, predominantly – but not exclusively – on the Internet.

SHARE

One non-Internet source is SHARE, best known for its 45 years of technical conferences. The SHARE Web site, at http://www.share.org lists all of the sessions at upcoming and recent conferences. Select Conferences from the left sidebar, then the conference you are interested in. From the right sidebar, under Agenda, select Online Version.

You will see some of the technical tracks listed, and can select any of them to see all of the relevant sessions available. Further down the page, you can select sessions by day, session number, or project. But, near the top of the page is the Search the Agenda box that allows you specify one or more keywords separated by AND, OR, or AND NOT.

At March’s conference in Anaheim, a search for RACF listed 14 sessions, while ‘racf OR security’ found 94. At first, a session entitled ‘Selling Ducks on the Web’ may seem off-topic, until you realize what it is about. Security and encryption are part of the discussion of Ducks Unlimited’s System/390-based Web site.

Remember that organizations, not individuals, are members of SHARE. Qualifying organizations must use an IBM computer system or operating system and must send a representative to at least one SHARE conference a year to maintain their membership. Full details are available by clicking on Membership from the left sidebar on the home page, and then on the Become a Member link.
GSE
In the US, GUIDE closed its doors and put its moral support behind SHARE. In Europe, the two merged to form G.U.I.D.E. Share Europe (GSE). GSE’s home page is at http://www.gse.org, and GSE UK has its own home page at http://www.gse.org.uk

COMPUTER SECURITY INSTITUTE
Although not as old as SHARE, the Computer Security Institute (CSI) recently completed its first quarter century. CSI’s Web site at http://www.gocsi.com offers both abstracts and full text of selected articles from CSI publications, as well as press releases. Any of the three could appear when you click on a link. But it’s worth the effort given the amount of great material available here.
And it’s not just articles. The CSI Firewall Product Resource link near the top of the home page takes you to a page with links to the Firewall Search Centre and the Firewall Archives. The Search Centre allows you to get information on individual products or to compare products.

WSC
Not to be confused with the other WSC (IBM’s Washington Systems Centre), Washington Systems Consulting specializes in SMS and security. It published a quarterly WSC Times for a number of years, and RACF was a frequent topic. Issues are available on-line at http://www.wscinc.com/frm_html/rtim1.htm
The most recent issues are offered complete in Adobe PDF format, requiring the free Adobe reader. Earlier issues offer selected articles for direct viewing on the Web. Unfortunately, you have to look at each issue to determine its contents, but the effort is worth it. The 3Q 1995 edition, for instance, offers only one article for on-line viewing, but that article covers RACF security for hsm.
The Atlanta-based Georgia RACF Users’ Group (GARUG) has brought together a wealth of useful resources on its home page at http://www.mindspring.com/~ajc10/garug.html

The main menu, near the top of the page, can be easy to miss as it’s in the form of a combo box: click on the down arrow to see the possible choices, then select one of them. Probably of greatest interest is the Program Library page. The GARUG library is SAS routines to read RACF and SMF data. Also offered as a zip file, the IRUG tape is a variety of RACF routines collected by other RACF user groups (RUGs). Finally, there’s a link to Nigel’s Utilities, which will be discussed in a future article in this series.

Although much of the information is in the form of links to Web sites run by others, GARUG even hosts some of the material you wouldn’t expect it to, such as the newsletter of a New York-based RACF users’ group.

The main menu also includes links to two GARUG-maintained pages on selected RACF and security training and conferences upcoming across the US. But the main menu doesn’t provide a path to all of the available information. At the bottom of the home page itself, for example, you will find a link to GARUG’s list of other RACF user groups in the US.

CONVERTING TO RACF

Even though its main purpose is to help market CONSUL Risk Management’s T2R and A2R automated conversion assistants, the detailed RACF conversion plans from CA-TSS and CA-ACF/2 can be very useful on their own. Even the descriptions of T2R and A2R provide valuable insight into both the scope and functionality involved in doing it all yourself.

SNA SERVER

Microsoft Host Integration Server 2000 is the new name for SNA Server, but it’s still in beta. If you plan to use SNA Server 4.0, http://www.microsoft.com/sna is the home page. But perhaps the most useful page is found by selecting ‘Feature description for SNA Server 4.0 SP3’ from the right sidebar, then ‘Features at a Glance’ from the Section Contents near the top right corner of the page. Its detailed description of SNA Server features includes significant information on security issues in a section towards the bottom of the page titled ‘Enterprise Security Integration’.

Near the top of this Features page is a row of links that includes Technical Papers. Although it links to another Microsoft Web page, the documents are written by others. As such, they vary significantly, and only some are white papers. Several cover security issues, such as single sign-on and secure remote access.

Clicking on a link for a technical paper gives you a description anywhere from a short paragraph to almost a full white paper in its own right. The Download link in the upper right hand corner, with a size listed below it, can be clicked to transfer an executable zipped copy of the paper in Microsoft Word format to your workstation. Of the two I tested, one initiated WinZIP, which I have installed on my workstation, while the other ran an embedded unzip-only copy of PKZip from a command line (I don’t have PKZip installed).

A useful set of Frequently-Asked Questions (FAQs) is available by selecting Deployment & Support from the left sidebar of any of these pages, then FAQs from a row of links at the top of the page. For example, the last question asks about the bulk migration tool for host security integration feature.

To find non-Microsoft products that can expand the functionality of SNA Server, select ‘Product Showcase’ from the left sidebar of any of these pages, then ‘3rd Party Solutions’ from a row of links at the top of the page and ‘Third Party Resource Guide’ from the ‘More Resources’ section near the top right corner of the page. For example, HALO SSO manages single sign-on between OS/390 and NT.
COUPLING FACILITY

CFSIZER at http://www.s390.ibm.com/cfsizer calculates structure sizes for each IBM systems software product that uses the sysplex Coupling Facility (CF). Select the product, such as RACF, from the left sidebar. A Web page will appear with fields where you need to enter the relevant values that determine the structure size.

Hit the Click Here to Size Structure button, and you’ll see a list of CF structures, with function, type, name, and size indicated. The rest of the page includes a sample CFRM policy statement.

IBM

In upcoming issues, we’ll cover the many sources of information available from IBM. But if you can’t wait, there’s one thing worth remembering: RACF is now part of the OS/390 Security Server. So if a search on RACF doesn’t produce the results you’re looking for, try Security Server instead.

Jon E Pearkins  
(Canada)  
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You don’t have to lose your subscription when you move to another location – let us know your new address, and the name of your successor at your current address, and we will send RACF Update to both of you, for the duration of your subscription. There is no charge for the additional copies.
Contributing to **RACF Update**

In addition to **RACF Update**, the Xephon family of **Update** publications now includes **CICS Update, MVS Update, TCP/SNA Update, VSAM Update, DB2 Update, AIX Update, Domino Update, MQ Update, NT Update, Oracle Update, SQL Server Update**, and **TSO/ISPF Update**. Although the articles published are of a very high standard, the vast majority are not written by professional writers, and we rely heavily on our readers themselves taking the time and trouble to share their experiences with others. Many have discovered that writing an article is not the daunting task that it might appear to be at first glance.

They have found that the effort needed to pass on valuable information to others is more than offset by our generous terms and conditions and the recognition they gain from their fellow professionals. Often, just a few hundred words are sufficient to describe a problem and the steps taken to solve it.

If you have ever experienced any difficulties with RACF, or made an interesting discovery, you could receive a cash payment, a free subscription to any of our **Updates**, or a credit against any of Xephon’s wide range of products and services, simply by telling us all about it. For a copy of our **Notes for Contributors**, which explains the terms and conditions under which we publish articles, please write to the editor, Fiona Hewitt, at any of the addresses shown on page 2, or e-mail her at fionah@xephon.com.
Release 9 of OS/390 supports the new cryptographic capabilities in System/390 G5 and G6 servers. There’s also additional support for digital certificates, which lets more users of a Web application access the application with RACF but with less administration.

For further information, contact your local IBM representative, or visit the Web site at http://www.ibm.com

* * *

William Data Systems has previewed Version 1.1 of its FTPalert, promising to overcome the major integrity and control problems that arise when TCP/IP’s File Transfer Protocol is used to transfer data to or from OS/390 mainframes.

The OS/390 application interfaces with both TCP/IP and the installation’s security facilities, such as RACF. All FTP data transfer activity is reported as it occurs; both successful and unsuccessful FTP data transfers are logged to provide both an audit trail and a record of data transfer statistics; and user authority is checked before file transfers are permitted.

The software provides definitions for RACF and other security access facilities.

For further information, contact: William Data Systems, 5 High Street, Old Oxted, Surrey RH8 9LN, UK Tel: (01883) 723 999. URL: http://www.willdata.com

* * *

LockStar has announced Beta implementations of its end-to-end security software solution for user authentication and data security, focusing on RACF and DB2 support. The solution aims to allow mainframes and other core business resources and applications to use the trust and security of digital certificates and PKI, the de facto standard for Internet security.

For further information, contact: LockStar 1200 Wall Street West, 3rd floor, Lyndhurst, NJ 07071, USA. Tel: 201 508 3000. URL: www.lockstar.com

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