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RACF Update

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Sensitive commands and the ISPF/PDF log datasets

ISPF/PDF can be used to create printable listings of partitioned or sequential datasets and it can also maintain a log of activities. These items are kept in files called the list dataset and the log dataset, respectively. When needed, the two datasets are allocated automatically. They are temporary files named `<prefix>.<userid>.SPF<n>.LIST` and `<prefix>.<userid>.SPFLOG<n>.LIST`, where

- `<prefix>` is the dataset prefix in the TSO user profile.
- `<userid>` is the user identification used to connect to TSO/E and kept in a RACF database or the UADS.
- `<n>` is a sequence number ranging from 1 to 9.

The ISPF/PDF system-wide exit number 16 allows an installation to change the `<prefix>` used. The exit routine can provide a prefix up to 26 characters long. This could be useful in a Parallel Sysplex environment with shared datasets and userids for different OS/390 images. ISPF/PDF reserves the remaining 18 characters of the dataset name for its own use – see *Interactive System Productivity Facility (ISPF) Planning and Customizing* (SC28-1298) for more details.

The list dataset is used for temporary storage for data to be printed at a later time. This data includes, for example, data written as a result of:

- Using the LIST service.
- Issuing the PRINT, PRINT-HI, PRINTL, or PRINTLHI commands (but not PRINTG).
- Using ISPF/PDF Option 3 utilities.

The log dataset is used to capture data that can be useful for diagnosing problems. Its contents include, for example, data captured as a result of:

- Using the LOG service.
- Test and trace data such as ISPF/PDF TRACE mode data.
- ISPF/PDF Dialog test Option 7.7: Dialog trace data.

A PASSWORD command issued from an ISPF panel (like the TSO/E CMD panel, ISPF/PDF Option 6) is clearly visible in the ISPF log, as can be seen below:

```

Time                *** ISPF transaction log ***                Userid:

15:45  Start of ISPF Log - - - Session # 497 -----
15:46  TSO - Command - - ALU IBZZEX1 PASSWORD(TEST00)
15:54  TSO - Command - - PASSWORD USER(IBZZEX1) PASSWORD(TEST00 TEST01)

```

Often the ISPF log datasets are defined with a universal access of READ. This situation makes it easy for a person with bad intentions to find sensitive information that could easily be abused. This is especially true if there is some logic behind the password reset policy – like choosing a password of Xddmmyy (where *mmddy* represents the date). One option is to educate the users to issue the PASSWORD command without a value for new password, in which case TSO/E (actually RACF) will prompt for it. Once TSO/E has taken control, ISPF/PDF no longer knows what happens, so it will not be logged. Another possibility is to set the dataset log option to DELETE LOG FILE WHEN LOGOFF in all ISPF/PDF sessions. This is, however, a customization that is, by default, left to the user unless ISPF/PDF is customized rather heavily. Furthermore, ISPF/PDF cannot guarantee a successful delete of the dataset in the case of an ABEND or a cancelled session. Finally, the log datasets could be protected by traditional RACF (or equivalent External Security Manager – ESM) means. This seems like the most logical thing to do and it won't hurt for the people who have the SPECIAL attribute. To set the universal (UACC) to NONE for all the ISPF log datasets for all users could create other problems. Debugging ISPF/PDF applications could become very troublesome. Because the developer in this situation has no access to the log datasets of the users, finding and resolving a problem could be unnecessarily complicated.

Our recommendation is two-fold. The first part is to remove a number of commands like PASSWORD/PW from the system altogether, an approach that we discussed in 'Removing commands that have a security impact', *RACF Update*, issue 2, November 1995, pp. 45–50. The second part is to keep the existing ISPF/PDF log dataset protection but to remove the logging of sensitive commands.

As can be seen from the example, all RACF commands are kept in the ISPF log files. In the example, a user's profile is altered to set a new RACF password. In this case removing the ALTUSER/ALU RACF command is not a serious consideration. That's why we propose to set the ISPF logging to OFF for all RACF commands. This can be done in the ISPTCM module (see SC28-1298). Bit X'10' of the flag byte tells ISPF/PDF not to write the command to the log dataset. Because all RACF commands are known only to the TSO authorized command facilities and not to ISPF/PDF, they should be copied from the TSO/E definitions in SYS1.PARMLIB(IKJTSOxx) or from the CSECT IKJTABLS (aliased by IKJEFTE2, IKJEFTE8, IKJEFTAP, and IKJEFTNS) to the ISPTCM module.

Because ISPF/PDF has the last word in the creation of the environment once a command is defined in its own table, care should be taken with the other settings too. If the aim is solely to turn off the ISPF/PDF logging, it would seem sufficient to define the RACF commands with an X'10' flag (see list below). This would lead, however, to X'047' abends in the RACF environment module (IRRENV00). Abend X'047' indicates that an unauthorized program issued a restricted Supervisor Call (SVC) instruction. In general an authorized program runs in supervisor state, holds PSW key 0-7, or resides in an APF-authorized library. Since we didn't change the library, it is clear that ISPF intervenes and runs the command in an unauthorized (program problem state and user key) status once it is defined in the ISPTCM table.

The solution is to gather all TSO/E authorized RACF commands and to repeat the definitions in ISPTCM with a flag byte of

X'32'. This effectively turns off the ISPF logging without any other unwanted side-effects. The command is invoked as an authorized command (the X'20' bit) and ISPF/PDF knows that it is a program and not a CLIST or REXX EXEC (the X'02' flag). Other sensitive TSO/E authorized commands are not harmful, otherwise we could include them too. The TSO/E ACCOUNT command for instance is logged only when invoked. As with all TSO/E command processing under ISPF, subcommands are a matter for TSO/E to deal with. ISPF is involved only in setting up the requested environment.

The values of the ISPF flag byte for the current entry are shown below. The default is 02. The flag field is shown followed by its description:

- B'1.....' – reserved.
- B'.1.....' – command requires a function pool. Set this bit on for a command processor program that issues dialog services.
- B'..1.....' – command requires an authorization check. Set this bit on for a command processor that must be invoked as an authorized command.
- B'...1....' – command is not to be logged. Set this bit on if the TSO command buffer should not be written to the ISPLOG dataset.
- B'....1...' – command is not supported by ISPF. Set this bit on for commands that cannot be invoked under ISPF.
- B'.....1..' – command is a command procedure (CLIST). Set this bit on if this is the name of a CLIST member.
- B'.....1.' – command is a command processor. Set this bit on if this is the name of a command processor program module.
- B'.....1' – command requires a BLDL to be issued. Set this bit on if a BLDL is to be issued to determine whether this is a command processor module or a CLIST.

Since ISPTCM is known to SMP/E, changes should be applied with a user modification. The original ISPTCM Assembler source as delivered by IBM can be found in ISP.SISPSAMP(ISPTCMA). The member must be renamed to ISPTCM before assembly. In the example SMP/E job below, we assume that the site-specific ISPTCM is inserted. The added RACF commands can appear anywhere in between the ISPTCM HEADER and the ISPTCM END macro invocations. In the sample job, site-specific items include the JOBCARD, the UNIT NAME, the names of the system datasets, the name of the USERMOD, the FMID, the DISTLIB, the name of the CSI, and the ISPF/PDF target zone.

Notes:

- 1 Entries in ISPTCM do not have to be in alphabetical order but they are placed in this order in the load module. Do not be surprised if you check the result afterwards in the ISP.SISPLPA library and you cannot find your changes in the same place that you put them. This happened to us when we included all RACF commands at the start of the Assembler program and found them alphabetically ordered all over the load module.
- 2 The last step in the job includes a linkage-editor (or DFSMS Binder) statement to add an IDENTIFY record to the load module. IBM uses this method often when a PTF is applied and it seems a good habit to include an indicator of the SMP/E action that last changed the module at the start of it.

Start of job:

```
//IBZZEX4X JOB (JAN),'JAN DE DECKER',CLASS=A,MSGCLASS=X,NOTIFY=&SYSUID,
//          REGION=ØM,COND=(Ø,NE)
//*
//* ISPF/PDF TSO/E AUTHORIZED COMMAND TABLE
//*
//SØ      EXEC PGM=ASMA9Ø,REGION=ØM,
//          PARM='DECK,NOOBJECT'
//SYSLIB  DD DSN=SYS1.MACLIB,DISP=SHR
//          DD DSN=SYS1.MODGEN,DISP=SHR
//          DD DSN=ISP.SISPMACS,DISP=SHR
```

```

//SYSUT1 DD UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(1700,(600,100))
//SYSUT2 DD UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(1700,(600,100))
//SYSUT3 DD UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(1700,(600,100))
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
//SYSPUNCH DD DSN=##LOADSET,
// DISP=(,PASS),
// SPACE=(CYL,(5,1)),UNIT=SYSALLDA
//SYSIN DD *
PUNCH '++ USERMOD (IUMOD05).'
PUNCH '++ VER (Z038) FMID(HIF4402).'
PUNCH '++ MOD (ISPTCM) DISTLIB(AISPMOD1) LMOD(ISPTCM).'
```

Insert your old ISPTCM header here.

```

*
* ALL RACF COMMANDS FROM IKJTS000
*
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=AD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ADDGROUP NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ADDSD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ADDUSER NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=AG NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ALD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ALG NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ALTDSD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ALTGROUP NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ALTUSER NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=ALU NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=AU NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=BLKUPD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=CO NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=CONNECT NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=DD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=DELDSD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=DELGROUP NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=DEUSER NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=DG NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=DU NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=IRRDP100 NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=LD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=LG NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=LISTDSD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=LISTGRP NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=LISTUSER NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=LU NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=PASSWORD NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=PE NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=PERMIT NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=PW NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RALT NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
```



```

ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RALTER NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RDEF NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RDEFINE NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RDEL NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RDELETE NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RE NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=REMOVE NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RL NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RLIST NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=RVARY NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=SEARCH NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=SETR NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=SETR_OPTS NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR
ISPMTCM FLAG=32,ENTNAME=SR NOLOG, TSO CMD, CMD PROCESSOR

```

```

*
* END OF ADDED RACF COMMANDS
*

```

Insert your old commands and ISPTCM END statement here.

```

//S1 EXEC PGM=GIMSMP
//SMPCSI DD DSN=SPB1.MVS.V240.GLOBAL.CSI,DISP=SHR
//SMPHOLD DD DUMMY
//SMP_CNTL DD *
SET BDY(MVST100).
RESTORE S(IUMOD05) /* REMOVE USERMOD IF APPLIED */ .
RESETRC /* RESET RETURN CODE */ .
SET BDY(GLOBAL) .
REJECT S(IUMOD05) BYPASS(APPLYCHECK) .
RESETRC /* RESET RETURN CODE */ .
SET BDY(GLOBAL) .
RECEIVE S(IUMOD05) /* RECEIVE USERMOD */ .
SET BDY(MVST100) .
APPLY S(IUMOD05) /* APPLY USERMOD */ .
LIST SYSMOD(IUMOD05) /* LIST USERMOD */ .
/*
//SMPPTFIN DD DSN=&&LOADSET,DISP=(OLD,DELETE)
// DD *
IDENTIFY ISPTCM('IUMOD05')
/*

```

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RACF in focus – understanding WebSphere MQ security

This is a regular column focusing on specific aspects of RACF. In this issue, we will discuss security issues related to the IBM middleware known as WebSphere MQ, and see how to implement security for it.

BACKGROUND

WebSphere MQ is what was previously known as MQSeries. This is the middleware that can run on multiple platforms, and its aim is to provide user-friendly ways for applications on different platforms to communicate with each other.

It is important to understand that, since the MQ software can reside on different platforms, different security mechanisms are involved.

For IBM mainframe (OS/390 and z/OS) platforms, security is implemented via SAF calls to RACF. And this is what we will be discussing here. For distributed platforms, MQ security is implemented via 'Callable Services' and 'Object Authority Manager'. We shall not discuss that here. The mainframe MQ security is more robust and granular than the MQ security found on other platforms.

Even though we will not discuss MQ security on other platforms, protecting WebSphere MQ resources on the mainframe poses some peculiar challenges, since the application connections can be from any other platform. Also, there are some things peculiar to the security aspects of MQ itself. For example, there is something called 'switch profiles', which are unique to this product. The concept of switch profiles is not found anywhere else in RACF.

PROTECTING MQ RESOURCES

WebSphere MQ security is achieved in RACF by activating

classes for MQ. These are MQADMIN, MQCONN, MQQUEUE, MQCMDSD, MQPROC, and MQNLIST. You need to activate these classes and build appropriate profiles.

The MQ profiles are similar to DB2 profiles in one respect – they are prefixed by the subsystem name, followed by other relevant information about the profile. To simplify, we will use MQPP as the subsystem id in all the examples below.

The good thing about MQ security is that it can be implemented gradually – you do not have to protect all MQ resources at once. A phased approach is desirable because it allows you to minimize the impact on the user community, and also to learn from your mistakes.

MQADMIN CLASS

We will first consider the MQADMIN class because it is the one that allows you to gradually implement MQ security.

Profiles in this class define administrative controls, alternative user profiles, context control profiles, resource-level control profiles, and switch profiles.

Among the administrative controls at your disposal is the ability to switch off some of the security checking for MQ. And this is where switch profiles come in.

For example, if you have a profile:

```
MQPP.NO.COMMAND.CHECKS
```

then security for MQ commands will not be checked by RACF. The mere presence of this profile in the MQADMIN class is the ‘switch’ that turns command-level security OFF, hence the term ‘switch profiles’. All profiles in the MQCMDSD class described below will be ignored. To start protecting MQ commands, you need to remove this profile.

Similarly you can define switch profiles for the following, to bypass MQ security:

- MQPP.NO.QUEUE.CHECKS – bypasses profiles in MQQUEUE class.

- MQPP.NO.CONNECT.CHECKS – bypasses profiles in MQCONN class.
- MQPP.NO.ALTERNATE.USER.CHECKS – bypasses alternate user checking.
- MQPP.NO.NLIST.CHECKS – bypasses profiles in MQNLIST class.
- MQPP.NO.PROCESS.CHECKS – bypasses profiles in MQPROC class.

There is even the ability to switch off the security for an entire subsystem, for all classes. For example, the profile MQPP.NO.SUBSYS.SECURITY will turn off security checking for the entire MQPP subsystem!

It follows that if it is your job to ensure that full MQ security has been implemented at your site, one of the things you have to do is to verify that there are no SUBSYS.NO profiles in the MQADMIN class. If there are no switch profiles, by default, MQ security checking will be done if the class is active.

By the way, there are no userids or groups in the access lists of switch profiles. Neither is UACC used.

MQ allows you to specify an alternative userid to do your work, if you are so authorized. The concept is similar to that of the SURROGAT class.

For example, the profile MQPP.USER1.ALTUSER specifies that userid USER1 can do work under the alternative userid ALTUSER.

MQCONN CLASS

The MQCONN class contains MQ connection profiles. These profiles define who can connect to MQ, and by what means.

Here are some examples:

- MQPP.BATCH specifies who can access MQ applications from batch and TSO.

- MQPP.CICS specifies who can access MQ applications from CICS transactions.
- MQPP.IMS specifies who can access MQ applications from IMS transactions.
- MQPP.CHIN specifies who can access MQ applications via channel initiator programs.

In all cases, users need READ access to these profiles.

And remember, you want to make sure you do not have the profile MQPP.NO.CONNECT.CHECKS in the MQADMIN class, otherwise security checking for the MQCONN class will be bypassed.

MQQUEUE CLASS

Profiles in the MQQUEUE class determine who can use the MQ application queue resources. This is where you will have to interact with your MQ people and determine what queue names are being used at your installation.

Example:

```
MQPP.QUEUE.NAME
```

The level of access required in the access lists of these profiles depends on the type of operation required:

- Inquire and browse type functions require READ access.
- Input, output, and bind require UPDATE access.
- SET requires ALTER access.

If you want to protect MQ's queue resources, make sure the profile MQPP.NO.QUEUE.CHECKS in the MQADMIN class is absent, otherwise security checking for the MQQUEUE class will be bypassed.

MQCMDS CLASS

Profiles in the MQCMDS class protect MQ commands.

For example, the profile MQPP.ARCHIVE.* specifies who can use the MQ ARCHIVE command.

Display commands require READ access. Commands such as ARCHIVE, PING, RECOVER, RESET, etc require CONTROL access. The commands DEFINE, ALTER, DELETE, etc require ALTER access.

If a command affects a resource, then access to that resource must also be allowed for the command to execute successfully.

MQNLIST

Profiles in the MQNLIST class protect Namelist resources.

MQPROC

Profiles in the MQPROC class control MQ Process resources.

SUMMARY

We have seen how basic MQ security can be implemented in a phased manner. But please remember, you cannot do it alone. You need to involve your MQ support people, and, in some cases, the CICS people.

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Differentiating RACF REVOKED userids with ICHRIX01 and ICHRIX02

Information available in the RACF database does not always make it clear why a RACF userid has gone into REVOKE status. The most likely reasons for a userid becoming REVOKEd are:

- 1 An administrator purposely set the userid into REVOKE status.
- 2 The real owner of the userid entered too many consecutive incorrect password values while attempting to log on to the system.

It would be nice to be able to distinguish between these two different causes.

This article discusses using the ICHRIX01/ICHRX02 RACF exit pair to capture a userid state change (ie a userid going from nonREVOKEd to REVOKEd status while attempting to log on) and reflect that REVOKE reason into the RACF database. If ICHRIX02 determines that a userid has gone into REVOKE status (when the userid hadn't previously been in REVOKE status in the ICHRIX01 check), ICHRIX02 will set the X'04' bit in the FLAG4 field of the user base segment record for the userid in question.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW

ICHRX01 and ICHRIX02 are the RACF VERIFY(X) pre- and post-exits respectively. They will be invoked whenever a RACROUTE VERIFY(X) operation is requested (eg TSO log-on, CICS log-on). The ICHRIX01 exit captures and maintains the REVOKE status for the userid in question. ICHRIX02 examines this saved status and compares it with the current status for the userid. If the userid has gone into REVOKE status (almost assuredly the result of too many invalid password attempts), ICHRIX02 will set the X'04' bit in the FLAG4 field of the base segment record for this userid (leaving the already set X'80' bit intact). The use of the additional bit setting in the FLAG4 field does not compromise the normal use of this field by RACF and when a subsequent ALTUSER command is used to RESUME a userid that has had its FLAG4 field modified as described here, the flag is properly reset to X'00'.

USING THE FLAG4 INFORMATION

A post-processing program, RVKLST, can be used to display

the current revoke status of either all userids defined to RACF or one specific userid as provided in a parameter to the RVKLST utility program. For example, the following JCL can be used to produce an output listing providing the revoke status of every userid defined to a RACF database:

```
//RVKLST EXEC PGM=RVKLST
//STEPLIB DD DSN=auth.load.library,DISP=SHR
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
```

Running the above job will produce sample output similar to the following:

Userid	Revoke Status
ABARS	Not REVOKED
APPC	Not REVOKED
ASCH	REVOKED
BLSJPRMI	REVOKED
BPXOINIT	Not REVOKED
BPXROOT	Not REVOKED
USER1	Administrator REVOKED
USER2	Not REVOKED
USER3	Not REVOKED
USER4	Date REVOKED
USER5	Not REVOKED
USER6	Password violation REVOKED

The above is merely a representative example of the output. On even a modestly-sized RACF database, there would be many more userids than the sample output provides.

You can also use the RVKLST utility to display the REVOKE status of a single RACF userid. Use an EXEC statement PARM specification to display the REVOKE status of a single userid. For example, to display the REVOKE status for userid USER12, use the following job:

```
//RVKLST EXEC PGM=RVKLST,PARM='USER12'
//STEPLIB DD DSN=auth.load.library,DISP=SHR
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
```

Running the RVKLST utility against a RACF database that has the specified userid REVOKEd because of too many password violations, and this article's ICHRIX01/ICHRIX02 exits active, will show output similar to the following:

Userid	Revoke Status
-----	-----
USER12	Password violation REVOKED

PROGRAM LINKAGE AND EXIT MANAGEMENT

RVKLST, ICHRIX01, and ICHRIX02 require standard assembly with SYSLIB specifying SYS1.MACLIB and SYS1.MODGEN. The RVKLST program will need to be link-edited into an authorized load library using a linkedit job similar to the following:

```
//IEWL      EXEC  PGM=HEWLH096,PARM='XREF,LIST,MAP'
//SYSPRINT DD    SYSOUT=*
//SYSUT1   DD    UNIT=SYSDA,SPACE=(CYL,(2,1))
//OBJECT   DD    DSN=object.code.pds,DISP=SHR
//SYSLMOD  DD    DSN=auth.load.library,DISP=SHR
//SYSLIN   DD    *
            INCLUDE OBJECT(RVKLST)
            ENTRY   RVKLST
            SETCODE AC(1)
            NAME    RVKLST(R)
```

The ICHRIX01 and ICHRIX02 exits are recognized and activated by RACF at system IPL. Unless you have access to a dynamic RACF exit loader (see 'Dynamic RACF exits', *RACF Update*, issue 33, August 2003) you will need to link-edit ICHRIX01 and ICHRIX02 into a load library that is contained in your LPALST concatenation. Use a link-edit job similar to the following:

```
//IEWL      EXEC  PGM=HEWLH096,PARM='XREF,LIST,MAP,RENT'
//SYSPRINT DD    SYSOUT=*
//SYSUT1   DD    UNIT=SYSDA,SPACE=(CYL,(2,1))
//OBJECT   DD    DSN=object.code.pds,DISP=SHR
//SYSLMOD  DD    DSN=lpalst.load.library,DISP=SHR
//SYSLIN   DD    *
            INCLUDE OBJECT(ICHRIX01)
            ENTRY   ICHRIX01
            SETCODE AC(1)
            NAME    ICHRIX01(R)
            INCLUDE OBJECT(ICHRIX02)
            ENTRY   ICHRIX02
            SETCODE AC(1)
            NAME    ICHRIX02(R)
```

After the exits have been link-edited into an LPA dataset, IPL the system. RACF should automatically recognize their existence.

CONCLUSION

Being able to determine the reason for a userid REVOKE condition can be important to a RACF administrator who is charged with the responsibility to RESUME a REVOKEd userid. Using the information captured and saved by ICHRIX01 and ICHRIX02 as discussed in this article can provide a useful extension to RACF administration. If you add this to the ability to capture RACF administrative REVOKE conditions (see article 'Using IRREVSX01 and the RACF database to help differentiate REVOKED userids' in *RACF Update*, issue 35, February 2004), your RACF administrators will have even more information available to them when they are requested to RESUME a userid.

I'm confident that this information will be of valuable use to your RACF administrators.

ICHRIX01 ASSEMBLER

```
*-----*
*
* ICHRIX01 is the RACF VERIFY(X) pre exit that is invoked by RACF *
* prior to userid verification. *
*
* This ICHRIX01 exit is designed to capture and save the current *
* REVOKE status (BASE segment FLAG4) for a user going through *
* RACROUTE VERIFY(X) processing. Specifically, this exit captures *
* this information so that it can be used by the ICHRIX01 *
* companion exit, ICHRIX02 (VERIFY(X) post exit), to determine *
* whether a userid has gone into REVOKE status between the VERIFY *
* pre exit and the VERIFY post exit. *
*
* ICHRIX01 must be reentrant and is entered in supervisor state, *
* key 0 so be careful. *
*
* The following JCL provides a sample job to linkedit the *
* ICHRIX01 exit: *
```

```

*
* //IEWL EXEC PGM=HEWLH096,PARM='XREF,LIST,MAP,RENT'
* //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
* //SYSUT1 DD UNIT=SYSDA,SPACE=(CYL,(2,1))
* //OBJECT DD DSN=object.code.pds,DISP=SHR
* //SYSLMOD DD DSN=lpalst.load.library,DISP=SHR
* //SYSLIN DD *
* INCLUDE OBJECT(ICHRIX01)
* ENTRY ICHRIX01
* SETCODE AC(1)
* NAME ICHRIX01(R)
*
* Under normal RACF operation, the existence of the ICHRIX01 exit
* is determined at system IPL time with module ICHRIX01 residing
* somewhere in the LPALSTxx concatenation of datasets. RACF does
* not honour this exit via dynamic LPA activation. In the absence
* of a dynamic RACF exit loader, it will be necessary to IPL your
* system to activate this exit.
*
* This ICHRIX01 exit dynamically acquires storage that is released
* by the companion ICHRIX02 exit.
*
*-----*
ICHRIX01 CSECT
ICHRIX01 AMODE 31
ICHRIX01 RMODE ANY
STM R14,R12,12(R13) Save incoming registers
LR R12,R15 Copy module base address
USING ICHRIX01,R12 Set addressability
LR R3,R13 Copy savearea address
LR R2,R1 Save parm address
STORAGE OBTAIN,LENGTH=WORKLEN,LOC=ANY
LR R0,R1 Copy storage address
LR R14,R1 Again
LR R13,R1 And again
L R1,=A(WORKLEN) Get length
XR R15,R15 Clear the fill byte
MVCL R0,R14 Clear the storage
USING WORKAREA,R13 Set addressability
ST R3,SAVEAREA+4 Save savearea address
*-----*
USING RIXPL,R2 Set parameter addressability
*-----*
L R6,RIXFLAG Get flag address
TM 0(R6),RIXENVCH+RIXENVDE Change or delete flag set?
BNZ RETURN Yes - return
TM 0(R6),RIXPSCKN PASSCHK=NO?
BO RETURN Yes - return
*-----*

```

```

XC      RACWORK(256),RACWORK  Clear the RACROUTE ...
XC      RACWORK+256(256),RACWORK+256 work area
MVC     ROUTWRK1(ROUTLEN1),RACROUT1 Copy the RACROUTE model
L       R6,RIXUID             Get userid area address
LA      R6,1(,R6)            Skip past length
RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,                                     X
        TYPE=EXTRACT,                                         X
        ENTITY=(R6),                                         X
        RELEASE=1.9.2,                                       X
        FIELDS=FLDLIST1,                                     X
        SUBPOOL=1,                                           X
        WORKA=RACWORK,MF=(E,ROUTWRK1) Extract some userid info
LTR     R15,R15              Extract ok?
BNZ     RETURN              No - we're done
LR      R6,R1               Copy the extract area address
*-----*
*   Save the relevant information from the EXTRACT workarea.   *
*-----*
FLD1    XR      R15,R15      Clear R15
        DS      ØH
        ICM     R15,B'ØØ11',4(R6)  Get data offset
        LA      R6,Ø(R15,R6)     Point to FLAG4 data area
        MVC     FLAG4SAV(1),4(R6) Save the flag data
FLD2    DS      ØH
        ICM     R15,B'1111',Ø(R6)  Get field length
        LTR     R15,R15          Any data?
        BZ      FLD3            No - check resume date
        LA      R6,4(R15,R6)     Point to REVOKEDT data area
        MVC     RVKDTS(3),4(R6)   Save the revoke date data
FLD3    DS      ØH
        ICM     R15,B'1111',Ø(R6)  Get field length
        LTR     R15,R15          Any data?
        BZ      FLD4            No - do next field if any
        LA      R6,4(R15,R6)     Point to RESUMEDT data area
        MVC     RSMDS(3),4(R6)    Save the resume date data
FLD4    DS      ØH
        XR      R8,R8            Clear R8
        XR      R9,R9            Clear R9
        IC      R9,Ø(,R1)        Save the subpool value
        ICM     R8,B'Ø111',1(R1)  Save w/a length
        STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=(R8),ADDR=(R1),SP=(R9)
*-----*
        STORAGE OBTAIN,LENGTH=RIXWLEN,LOC=ANY
XC      Ø(16,R1),Ø(R1)         Clear the storage
L       R3,RIXWA              Get address of work word
ST      R1,Ø(,R3)             Save the work address
LR      R5,R1                 Copy the storage address
USING  RIXWAREA,R5           Set addressability
MVC     RIXWID(4),=C'RIXW'    Move in the eyecatcher

```

```

L      R6,RIXUID          Get userid area address
LA     R6,1(,R6)         Skip past length
MVC    RIXWUID(8),Ø(R6)  Save the userid
MVC    RIXWFLG1(1),FLAG4SAV Copy FLAG4
MVC    RIXWRVDT(3),RVKDTSAV Copy revoke date
MVC    RIXWRSDT(3),RSMDTSAV Copy resume date
*-----*
DROP   R5
*-----*
RETURN DS    ØH
L      R3,SAVEAREA+4     Copy old savearea address
LR     R1,R13            Get temp storage address
        STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=WORKLEN,ADDR=(R1)
LR     R13,R3           Copy the old savearea address
LM     R14,R12,12(R13)  Restore the registers
XR     R15,R15          RC=Ø
BR     R14             Return
*-----*
FLDLIST1 DC    F'3'
        DC    CL8'FLAG4  '
        DC    CL8'REVOKEDT'
        DC    CL8'RESUMEDT'
*-----*
RACROUT1 RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,      X
        TYPE=EXTRACT,                  X
        CLASS='USER',                  X
        RELEASE=1.9.2,                  X
        MF=L
ROUTLEN1 EQU    *-RACROUT1
*-----*
WORKAREA DSECT
SAVEAREA DS    18F
FLAG4SAV DS    XL1
RVKDTSAV DS    XL3
RSMDTSAV DS    XL3
CURRDATE DS    XL3
RETCODE DS    F
ROUTWRK1 DS    ØD,CL(ROUTLEN1)
RACWORK DS    ØD,CL(512)
WORKLEN EQU    *-WORKAREA
*-----*
RIXWAREA DSECT
RIXWID DS    CL4
RIXWUID DS    CL8
RIXWFLGS DS    ØF
RIXWFLG1 DS    XL1
RIXWFLG2 DS    XL1
RIXWFLG3 DS    XL1
RIXWFLG4 DS    XL1

```

```

RIXWRVDT DS    XL3
RIXWRSDT DS    XL3
RIXWLEN  EQU   *-RIXWAREA
*-----*
          ICHRIXP ,
*-----*
R0      EQU   0
R1      EQU   1
R2      EQU   2
R3      EQU   3
R4      EQU   4
R5      EQU   5
R6      EQU   6
R7      EQU   7
R8      EQU   8
R9      EQU   9
R10     EQU   10
R11     EQU   11
R12     EQU   12
R13     EQU   13
R14     EQU   14
R15     EQU   15
*-----*
          END

```

ICHRIX02 ASSEMBLER

```

*-----*
*
* ICHRIX02 is the RACF VERIFY(X) post exit that is invoked by RACF
* after userid verification.
*
* This ICHRIX02 exit is designed to use information captured in the
* ICHRIX01 (VERIFY(X) pre exit) to determine whether a userid has
* gone into REVOKE status between the VERIFY pre exit and the
* VERIFY post exit.  If that is the case, ICHRIX02 sets the x'04'
* bit on in the FLAG4 of the BASE segment record for the
* corresponding userid.  This indicates that the userid has gone
* into REVOKE status because of too many invalid password attempts.
*
* ICHRIX02 must be reentrant and is entered in supervisor state,
* key 0 so be careful.
*
* The following JCL provides a sample job to linkedit the
* ICHRIX02 exit:
*
* //IEWL      EXEC  PGM=HEWLH096,PARM='XREF,LIST,MAP,RENT'
* //SYSPRINT DD   SYSOUT=*
*-----*

```

```

* //SYSUT1 DD UNIT=SYSDA,SPACE=(CYL,(2,1)) *
* //OBJECT DD DSN=object.code.pds,DISP=SHR *
* //SYSLMOD DD DSN=lpalst.load.library,DISP=SHR *
* //SYSLIN DD * *
* INCLUDE OBJECT(ICHRIX02) *
* ENTRY ICHRIX02 *
* SETCODE AC(1) *
* NAME ICHRIX02(R) *
*
* Under normal RACF operation, the existence of the ICHRIX02 exit *
* is determined at system IPL time with module ICHRIX02 residing *
* somewhere in the LPALSTxx concatenation of datasets. RACF does *
* not honour this exit via dynamic LPA activation. In the absence *
* of a dynamic RACF exit loader, it will be necessary to IPL your *
* system to activate this exit. *
*
* This ICHRIX02 exit releases storage that has been previously *
* acquired by the companion ICHRIX01 exit. *
*
*-----*
ICHRIX02 CSECT
ICHRIX02 AMODE 31
ICHRIX02 RMODE ANY
STM R14,R12,12(R13)
LR R12,R15 Copy module base address
USING ICHRIX02,R12 Set addressability
LR R3,R13 Copy savearea address
LR R2,R1 Save parm address
STORAGE OBTAIN,LENGTH=WORKLEN,LOC=ANY
LR R0,R1 Copy storage address
LR R14,R1 Again
LR R13,R1 And again
L R1,=A(WORKLEN) Get length
XR R15,R15 Clear the fill byte
MVCL R0,R14 Clear the storage
USING WORKAREA,R13
ST R3,SAVEAREA+4 Save savearea address
*-----*
USING RIXPL,R2 Set parameter addressability
*-----*
L R6,RIXFLAG Get flag address
TM 0(R6),RIXENVCH+RIXENVDE Change or delete flag set?
BNZ RETURN Yes - return
TM 0(R6),RIXPSCKN PASSCHK=NO?
BO RETURN Yes - return
*-----*
XC RACWORK(256),RACWORK Clear the RACROUTE ...
XC RACWORK+256(256),RACWORK+256 work area
MVC ROUTWRK1(ROUTLEN1),RACROUT1 Copy the RACROUTE model

```

```

L      R6,RIXUID          Get userid area address
LA     R6,1(,R6)         Skip past length
RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,
      TYPE=EXTRACT,
      ENTITY=(R6),
      RELEASE=1.9.2,
      FIELDS=FLDLIST1,
      SUBPOOL=1,
      WORKA=RACWORK,MF=(E,ROUTWRK1) Extract some userid info
LTR    R15,R15           Extract ok?
BNZ    RETURN            No - we're done
LR     R6,R1             Copy the extract area address
*-----*
FLD1  XR    R15,R15      Clear R15
      DS    ØH
      ICM   R15,B'ØØ11',4(R6)  Get data offset
      LA    R6,Ø(R15,R6)      Point to flag4 data area
      MVC   FLAG4SAV(1),4(R6)  Save the flag data
FLD2  DS    ØH
      ICM   R15,B'1111',Ø(R6)  Get field length
      LTR   R15,R15           Any data?
      BZ    FLD3              No - check resume date
      LA    R6,4(R15,R6)      Point to revokedt data area
      MVC   RVKDTSAV(3),4(R6)  Save the revoke date data
FLD3  DS    ØH
      ICM   R15,B'1111',Ø(R6)  Get field length
      LTR   R15,R15           Any data?
      BZ    FLD4              No - do next field if any
      LA    R6,4(R15,R6)      Point to resumedt data area
      MVC   RSMDSAV(3),4(R6)  Save the resume date data
FLD4  DS    ØH
      XR    R8,R8             Clear R8
      XR    R9,R9             Clear R9
      IC    R9,Ø(,R1)         Save the subpool value
      ICM   R8,B'Ø111',1(R1)   Save w/a length
      STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=(R8),ADDR=(R1),SP=(R9)
*-----*
L      R3,RIXWA          Get address of work word
L      R5,Ø(,R3)         Get ICHRIXØ1 work area address
LTR    R5,R5             A work area?
BZ     RETURN            No - go home
USING  RIXWAREA,R5      Set addressability
L      R6,RIXUID          Get userid area address
LA     R6,1(,R6)         Skip past length
CLC    RIXWUID(8),Ø(R6)   Same userid?
BNE    RETURN            No - go home
CLC    RIXWFLG1(1),FLAG4SAV  Status the same?
BE     RETURN            Yes - go home
*-----*

```



```

TM    FLAG4SAV,X'80'      Revoked?
BNO   RETURN             No - go home
OI    FLAG4SAV,X'04'      Set password violation revoke flag
MVC   FLAG4LEN(4),=F'1'   Set length
XC    RACWORK(256),RACWORK Clear the RACROUTE ...
XC    RACWORK+256(256),RACWORK+256 work area
MVC   ROUTWRK1(ROUTLEN1),RACROUT1 Copy the RACROUTE model
L     R6,RIXUID           Get userid area address
LA    R6,1(,R6)           Skip past length
RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,                                X
      TYPE=REPLACE,                                       X
      ENTITY=(R6),                                         X
      RELEASE=1.9.2,                                       X
      FIELDS=FLDLIST2,                                     X
      SEGDATA=FLAG4LEN,                                    X
      WORKA=RACWORK,MF=(E,ROUTWRK1) Update FLAG4
LTR   R15,R15            Replace ok?
BNZ   UPDTERR            No - indicate update error
*-----*
*
* Enable the following commented code lines (the lines prefixed
* with '*==>') if you want to issue a WTO console message when
* the FLAG4 field has been successfully updated to indicate a
* password violation revoke condition.
*
*-----*
*==>   MVC   WTOWRK(WTOLN),WTOLST  Copy WTO model
*==>   MVC   WTOWRK+4(L'WTOMSG1),WTOMSG1 Copy message model
*==>   MVC   WTOWRK+4+54(8),Ø(R6)  Copy the userid
*==>   WTO   MF=(E,WTOWRK)         Issue the WTO
      B     RETURN                 Return
UPDTERR DS   ØH
*-----*
*
* If the FLAG4 REPLACE operation fails, issue a WTO console
* message that indicates the userid for which the failure occurred
* and the SAF and RACF return codes generated by the RACROUTE
* request.
*
*-----*
      MVC   WTOWRK(WTOLN),WTOLST  Copy WTO model
      MVC   WTOWRK+4(L'WTOMSG2),WTOMSG2 Copy message model
      MVC   WTOWRK+4+35(8),Ø(R6)  Copy the userid
      ST    R15,DBL2               Save the SAF return code
      UNPK  DBL1(9),DBL2(5)        Unpack
      NC    DBL1(8),=8X'ØF'        Turn off high order nibbles
      TR    DBL1(8),=C'Ø123456789ABCDEF' Make things readable
      MVC   WTOWRK+4+53(4),DBL1+4 Copy SAF return code
      MVC   DBL2(4),ROUTWRK1       Save the RACF return code

```

```

UNPK  DBL1(9),DBL2(5)      Unpack
NC     DBL1(8),=8X'0F'    Turn off high order nibbles
TR     DBL1(8),=C'0123456789ABCDEF' Make things readable
MVC    WTOWRK+4+68(4),DBL1+4 Copy RACF return code
WTO    MF=(E,WTOWRK)      Issue the WTO
B      RETURN             Return
DROP   R5

```

```

RETURN  DS      0H
        L       R3,RIXWA      Get address of work word
        L       R5,0(,R3)     Get ICHRIX01 work area address
        LTR     R5,R5         A work area?
        BZ      NORIXWA      No - don't release storage
        STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=RIXWLEN,ADDR=(R5)

```

```

NORIXWA DS      0H
        L       R3,SAVEAREA+4 Copy old savearea address
        LR      R1,R13        Get temp storage address
        STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=WORKLEN,ADDR=(R1)
        LR      R13,R3        Copy the old savearea address
        LM      R14,R12,12(R13) Restore the registers
        XR      R15,R15       RC=0
        BR      R14          Return

```

```

WTOMSG1 DC      C'ICHRIX02 - Password violation revocation captured for x
                xxxxxxxx and updated in BASE segment FLAG4 data.'

```

```

WTOMSG2 DC      C'ICHRIX02 - FLAG4 update failed for xxxxxxxx. SAF RC(xx
                xxx) RACF RC(xxxx).'

```

```

WTOLST  WTO     '
                                                X
                                                X
                ',ROUTCDE=(1),DESC=(6),MF=L

```

```

WTOLN   EQU     *-WTOLST

```

```

FLDLIST1 DC     F'3'
          DC     CL8'FLAG4   '
          DC     CL8'REVOKEDT'
          DC     CL8'RESUMEDT'

```

```

FLDLIST2 DC     F'1'
          DC     CL8'FLAG4   '

```

```

RACROUT1 RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,
          TYPE=EXTRACT,
          CLASS='USER',
          RELEASE=1.9.2,
          MF=L
                                                X
                                                X
                                                X
                                                X

```

```

ROUTLEN1 EQU     *-RACROUT1

```

```

WORKAREA DSECT
SAVEAREA DS      18F
FLAG4LEN DS      F
FLAG4SAV DS      XL1
RVKDTSAV DS      XL3
RSMDSAV DS       XL3
WTOWRK  DS       ØD,CL(WTOLN)
ROUTWRK1 DS      ØD,CL(ROUTLEN1)
RACWORK DS       ØD,CL(512)
DBL1    DS       2D
DBL2    DS       2D
WORKLEN EQU      *-WORKAREA
*-----*
RIXWAREA DSECT
RIXWID  DS      CL4
RIXWUID DS      CL8
RIXWFLGS DS     ØF
RIXWFLG1 DS     XL1
RIXWFLG2 DS     XL1
RIXWFLG3 DS     XL1
RIXWFLG4 DS     XL1
RIXWRVDT DS     XL3
RIXWRSDT DS     XL3
RIXWLEN EQU     *-RIXWAREA
*-----*
                ICHRXP ,
*-----*
RØ      EQU     Ø
R1      EQU     1
R2      EQU     2
R3      EQU     3
R4      EQU     4
R5      EQU     5
R6      EQU     6
R7      EQU     7
R8      EQU     8
R9      EQU     9
R1Ø     EQU     1Ø
R11     EQU     11
R12     EQU     12
R13     EQU     13
R14     EQU     14
R15     EQU     15
                END

```

RVKLST ASSEMBLER

```

RVKLST CSECT
RVKLST AMODE 31

```

```

RVKLST  RMODE 24                      DCBS NEED 24-BIT ADDRESSES
*****
*
* THE RVKLST PROGRAM CAN WORK WITH ANY RACF DATABASE, BUT IS
* ESPECIALLY DESIGNED TO WORK WITH RACF EXITS AS FOLLOWS:
* - AN IRREVX01 RACF COMMAND EXIT THAT SETS THE X'08' BIT IN THE
*   FLAG4 USER BASE SEGMENT FIELD WHEN A USERID BECOMES REVOKED
*   VIA A RACF ALTUSER COMMAND
* - AN ICHRIX01/ICHRX02 VERIFY(X) PRE/POST EXIT PAIR THAT CAUSE
*   THE X'04' BIT TO BE SET IN THE FLAG4 USER BASE SEGMENT FIELD
*   WHEN A USERID BECOMES REVOKED BECAUSE OF TOO MANY INVALID
*   PASSWORD ATTEMPTS
*
* THIS FLAG IS EXAMINED BY THE RVKLST PROGRAM AND IT CAN BE USED TO
* DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN A USERID THAT HAS BEEN REVOKED DUE TO TOO
* MANY INVALID LOGON ATTEMPTS AND A USERID THAT HAS BEEN REVOKED
* BY A RACF ADMINISTRATOR.
*
* THE RVKLST PROGRAM SHOULD RESIDE IN AN APF AUTHORIZED LIBRARY
* AND SHOULD BE LINKEDITED AC(1).
*
* THIS CAN BE A USEFUL TOOL FOR A RACF ADMINSTRATOR WHO MAY BE
* TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE REVOKE STATUS OF A CERTAIN USERID
* SHOULD BE CHANGED TO RESUME.  A USERID THAT IS IN 'REVOKED'
* STATUS MAY BE A GOOD CANDIDATE TO BE RESUMED, BUT ONE THAT IS
* 'Date REVOKED' OR 'Administrator REVOKED' MAY REQUIRE MORE
* SCRUTINY.
*
*****
PRINT GEN
STM  R14,R12,12(R13)      SAVE THE REGISTERS
LR   R12,R15              COPY MODULE BASE ADDRESS
LA   R11,4095(,R12)      SET SECOND BASE ...
LA   R11,1(,R11)         REGISTER ADDRESS
USING RVKLST,R12,R11     SET ADDRESSABILITY
LR   R10,R13             SAVE OLD SAVEAREA ADDRESS
LR   R2,R1               SAVE INCOMING PARM ADDRESS
STORAGE OBTAIN,LENGTH=WALEN GET SOME WORKING STORAGE
LR   R13,R1              COPY THE ADDRESS
LR   R0,R13              AGAIN
L    R1,=A(WALEN)        SET THE LENGTH
LR   R14,R13             SET SOURCE ADDRESS TO TARGET
XR   R15,R15             SET FILL BYTE
MVCL R0,R14              CLEAR THE STORAGE
ST   R10,4(,R13)        SAVE OLD SAVEAREA ADDRESS
USING WORKAREA,R13      WORKING STORAGE ADDRESSABILITY
*****
OPEN  (SYSPRINT,OUTPUT),MODE=31 OPEN OUTPUT DATASET
PUT   SYSPRINT,HDR1     WRITE FIRST HEADER

```

```

PUT    SYSPRINT,HDR2                WRITE SECOND HEADER
*****
L      R8,Ø(,R2)                    GET PARAMETER ADDRESS
CLC    Ø(2,R8),=H'Ø'                ANY PARM DATA?
BE     USRIDLST                      NO - IT'S A FULL LIST
CLC    Ø(2,R8),=H'8'                TOO MUCH DATA FOR A USERID?
BH     RETURN4                      YES - SET RC=4
B      ONEUSRID                     PROCESS ONE USERID
*****
USRIDLST EQU *
XC     XUID(4),XUID                 CLEAR XUID LENGTH AREA
MVC    XUID(2),=H'8'                SET DATA LENGTH
MVC    XUID+4(8),=8C' '            SET STARTING UID
UIDLOOP EQU *
XC     RACWORK(256),RACWORK        CLEAR RACROUTE ...
XC     RACWORK+256(256),RACWORK+256 WORKAREA STORAGE
MVC    ROUTWRK1(ROUTLEN1),RACROUT1 COPY RACROUTE PARM MODEL
RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,
      TYPE=EXTRACTN,
      ENTITYX=XUID,
      FIELDS=FLDLIST1,
      RELEASE=1.9.2,
      SUBPOOL=1,
      WORKA=RACWORK,
      MF=(E,ROUTWRK1)
LTR    R15,R15                     EXTRACT OK?
BZ     LISTOK                       YES - PROCESS DATA
ST     R15,RETCODE                 SAVE THE RETURN CODE
MVC    RACF_RC(8),ROUTWRK1        COPY RACF RTN/RSN CODES
B      LISTDONE                    WE'RE DONE
LISTOK EQU *
*****
*
* A USERID WAS EXTRACTED. MOVE THE DATA INTO AN OUTPUT BUFFER AND
* WRITE THE RECORD.
*
* USE THE DOOUTPUT ROUTINE FOR THIS PURPOSE. R1 SHOULD CONTAIN
* THE EXTRACT BUFFER ADDRESS. THE BUFFER IS RELEASED BY DOOUTPUT.
*
*****
MVC    SAVEUID(8),XUID+4           COPY THE USERID
BAL    R14,DOOUTPUT               CREATE NECESSARY OUTPUT
B      UIDLOOP                    PROCESS NEXT USERID
LISTDONE EQU *
CLOSE (SYSPRINT),MODE=31         CLOSE OUTPUT DATASET
B      RETURNØ                    WE'RE DONE
*****
ONEUSRID EQU *
MVC    SAVEUID(8),=8C' '          CLEAR THE TARGET USERID FIELD

```

```

XR      R15,R15                CLEAR R15
ICM     R15,B'0011',0(R8)      GET THE USERID LENGTH
BCTR    R15,0                  REDUCE BY ONE FOR EX
EX      R15,USRIDMVC           COPY THE USERID
XC      RACWORK(256),RACWORK   CLEAR RACROUTE ...
XC      RACWORK+256(256),RACWORK+256 WORKAREA STORAGE
MVC     ROUTWRK2(ROUTLEN2),RACROUT2 COPY RACROUTE PARM MODEL
RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,
        TYPE=EXTRACT,
        ENTITY=SAVEUID,
        FIELDS=FLDLIST1,
        RELEASE=1.9.2,
        SUBPOOL=1,
        WORKA=RACWORK,
        MF=(E,ROUTWRK2)
LTR     R15,R15                EXTRACT OK?
BZ      DOUSRID                YES - PROCESS DATA
MVC     OUTREC(133),=133C' '   CLEAR THE OUTPUT RECORD
MVC     OUTREC(8),SAVEUID      COPY THE USERID
MVC     OUTREC+10(11),=C'Not defined' USERID NOT IN DATABASE
PUT     SYSPRINT,OUTREC        WRITE THE OUTPUT RECORD
B       LISTDONE              GO FINISH UP
DOUSRID EQU      *
*****
*
*   THE USERID DATA WAS EXTRACTED.  MOVE THE DATA INTO AN OUTPUT
*   BUFFER AND WRITE THE RECORD.
*
*   USE THE DOOUTPUT ROUTINE FOR THIS PURPOSE.  R1 SHOULD CONTAIN
*   THE EXTRACT BUFFER ADDRESS.  THE BUFFER IS RELEASED BY DOOUTPUT.
*
*****
        BAL     R14,DOOUTPUT    CREATE NECESSARY OUTPUT
        B       LISTDONE       GO FINISH UP
*****
RETURN0 EQU      *
        L       R10,4(,R13)     SAVE INCOMING SAVEAREA ADDR
        LR      R1,R13          COPY TEMP STORAGE ADDR
        STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=WALEN,ADDR=(R1)
        LR      R13,R10         COPY INCOMING SAVEAREA ADDR
        LM      R14,R12,12(R13) RESTORE REGISTERS
        XR      R15,R15         SET RETURN CODE
        BR      R14             RETURN
*****
RETURN4 EQU      *
        L       R10,4(,R13)     SAVE INCOMING SAVEAREA ADDR
        LR      R1,R13          COPY TEMP STORAGE ADDR
        STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=WALEN,ADDR=(R1)
        LR      R13,R10         COPY INCOMING SAVEAREA ADDR

```

```

        LM      R14,R12,12(R13)          RESTORE REGISTERS
        LA      R15,4                    SET RETURN CODE
        BR      R14                      RETURN
*****
DOOUTPUT EQU *
        STM     R0,R15,SVAREA02         SAVE REGISTERS
        XC      SEGDATA(SEGDATAL),SEGDATA CLEAR SEGMENT DATA SAVE AREA
        XR      R6,R6                   CLEAR R6
        ICM     R6,B'0011',4(R1)        GET DATA OFFSET
        AR      R6,R1                   CALCULATE DATA ADDRESS
SVFLD1  EQU *
        ICM     R15,B'1111',0(R6)       GET DATA LENGTH
        MVC     SAVEFLG4(1),4(R6)      COPY FLAG4
SVFLD2  EQU *
        LA      R6,4(R15,R6)           POINT TO REVOKEDT
        ICM     R15,B'1111',0(R6)       GET DATA LENGTH
        LTR     R15,R15                 ANY DATA?
        BZ      SVFLD3                 NO - CHECK NEXT FIELD
        MVC     SAVERVDT(3),4(R6)      SAVE REVOKEDT
SVFLD3  EQU *
        LA      R6,4(R15,R6)           POINT TO RESUMEDT
        ICM     R15,B'1111',0(R6)       GET DATA LENGTH
        LTR     R15,R15                 ANY DATA?
        BZ      SVFLD4                 NO - CHECK NEXT FIELD
        MVC     SAVERSDT(3),4(R6)      SAVE RESUMEDT
SVFLD4  EQU *
*****
        XR      R7,R7                   CLEAR R7
        XR      R8,R8                   CLEAR R8
        ICM     R7,B'0111',1(R1)        GET STORAGE LENGTH
        ICM     R8,B'0001',0(R1)        GET SUBPOOL
        STORAGE RELEASE,LENGTH=(R7),ADDR=(R1),SP=(R8)
*****
RVKCHK  EQU *
        MVC     OUTREC(133),=133C' '    CLEAR THE OUTPUT RECORD
        MVC     OUTREC(8),SAVEUID       COPY THE USERID
        TIME   DEC                      GET CURRENT DATE/TIME
        STCM   R1,B'0111',CURRDATE     SAVE CURRENT DATE
        TM     SAVEFLG4,X'08'          ADMIN REVOKE?
        BZ     CHKLGRVK                 NO - CHK INVALID PWD REVOKE
        CLC    CURRDATE(3),SAVERSDT    CURRDATE >= RESUMEDT?
        BL     SETRVK1                  NO - REVOKED
        CLC    SAVERSDT(3),=3X'00'     A 'REAL' RESUMEDT?
        BNE    NORVK                    YES - NOT REVOKED
SETRVK1 EQU *
        MVC     OUTREC+10(21),=C'Administrator REVOKED' SET RVK STATUS
        B      RVKCHKDN                 WE'RE DONE THIS USERID
CHKLGRVK EQU *
        TM     SAVEFLG4,X'80'          REVOKED?

```

```

BZ      DTRVKCHK          NO - CHECK IF DATE REVOKED
TM      SAVEFLG4,X'04'    PWD VIOLATION REVOKE?
BO      SETRVK3          YES - SET PWD VIO MESSAGE
CLC     CURRDATE(3),SAVERSDT  CURRDATE >= RESUMEDT?
BL      SETRVK2          NO - REVOKED
CLC     SAVERSDT(3),=3X'00'  A 'REAL' RESUMEDT?
BNE     NORVK           YES - NOT REVOKED
SETRVK2 EQU      *
MVC     OUTREC+10(7),=C'REVOKED'  SET REVOKE STATUS
B       RVKCHKDN        WE'RE DONE THIS USERID
SETRVK3 EQU      *
MVC     OUTREC+10(26),=C'Password violation REVOKED' SET RVK ST
B       RVKCHKDN        WE'RE DONE THIS USERID
DTRVKCHK EQU     *
CLC     SAVERSDT(3),SAVERVDT  RESUMEDT < REVOKEDT?
BL      RVKOUTWN        YES - CURRDATE OUT OF RANGE
RVKINWN EQU     *
CLC     CURRDATE(3),SAVERSDT  CURRDATE >= RESUMEDT?
BNL     NORVK           YES - NOT REVOKED
CLC     CURRDATE(3),SAVERVDT  CURRDATE < REVOKEDT?
BL      NORVK           YES - NOT REVOKED
DATERVK EQU     *
MVC     OUTREC+10(12),=C'Date REVOKED' SET REVOKE STATUS
B       RVKCHKDN        WE'RE DONE THIS USERID
RVKOUTWN EQU    *
CLC     CURRDATE(3),SAVERSDT  CURRDATE < RESUMEDT?
BL      DATERVK         YES - REVOKED
CLC     CURRDATE(3),SAVERVDT  CURRDATE >= REVOKEDT?
BNL     DATERVK         YES - REVOKED
B       NORVK           OUT OF WINDOW, NO REVOKE
NORVK   EQU     *
MVC     OUTREC+10(11),=C'Not REVOKED' SET REVOKE STATUS
B       RVKCHKDN        WE'RE DONE THIS USERID
RVKCHKDN EQU    *
PUT     SYSPRINT,OUTREC      WRITE THE OUTPUT RECORD
*****
LM      R0,R15,SVAREA02    LOAD REGISTERS
BR      R14                RETURN
*****
USRIDMVC MVC    SAVEUID(*-*),2(R8)    COPY THE USERID
*****
SYSPRINT DCB    MACRF=(PM),LRECL=133,DSORG=PS,DDNAME=SYSPRINT
*****
HDR1    DC      CL133'Userid   Revoke Status'
HDR2    DC      CL133'-----'
*****
RACROUT1 RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT,          X
        TYPE=EXTRACTN,                      X
        CLASS='USER',                       X
        RELEASE=1.9.2,                      X

```



```

MF=L
ROUTLEN1 EQU *-RACROUT1
*****
RACROUT2 RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT, X
          TYPE=EXTRACT, X
          CLASS='USER', X
          RELEASE=1.9.2, X
          MF=L
ROUTLEN2 EQU *-RACROUT2
*****
FLDLIST1 DC F'3'
          DC C'FLAG4 ' REVOKE
          DC C'REVOKEDT' REVOKE DATE
          DC C'RESUMEDT' RESUME DATE
*****
          LTORG ,
*****
WORKAREA DSECT
SAVEAREA DS 18F
SVAREA02 DS 18F
RETCODE DS F
RACF_RC DS F
RACF_RSN DS F
EXTSAVE DS F
ROUTWRK1 DS 0D,CL(ROUTLEN1)
ROUTWRK2 DS 0D,CL(ROUTLEN2)
XUID DS 0D
      DS F
      DS CL8
*****
RACWORK DS 0D,CL512
DBL1 DS 2D
DBL2 DS 2D
SAVEUID DS CL8
SEGDATA DS 0D
SAVEFLG4 DS XL1
SAVERVDT DS XL3
SAVERSDT DS XL3
SEGDATA EQU *-SEGDATA
OUTREC DS CL133
CURRDATE DS XL3
WALEN EQU *-WORKAREA
R0 EQU 0
R1 EQU 1
R2 EQU 2
R3 EQU 3
R4 EQU 4
R5 EQU 5
R6 EQU 6
R7 EQU 7

```

```
R8      EQU      8
R9      EQU      9
R10     EQU     10
R11     EQU     11
R12     EQU     12
R13     EQU     13
R14     EQU     14
R15     EQU     15
        IRRPRXTW
        ICHPRCVT
        CVT      DSECT=YES
        END
```

Rudy Douglas (Canada)

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Contributing to *RACF Update*

Why not share your expertise and earn money at the same time? *RACF Update* is looking for program code, REXX EXECs, CLISTs, JavaScript, etc that experienced users of RACF have written to make their life, or the lives of their users, easier. We are also looking for explanatory articles, and hints and tips, from experienced users.

We will publish your article (after vetting by our expert panel) and send you a cheque, as payment, and two copies of the issue containing the article once it has been published. Articles can be of any length and should be e-mailed to the editor, Trevor Eddolls, at trevore@xephon.com.

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RACF protection for IND\$FILE

INTRODUCTION

RACF was designed with five levels of access authorization to datasets in mind – EXECUTE, CONTROL, UPDATE, ALTER, and READ. This dates from the days when interactive access to mainframe datasets was achieved almost exclusively using dumb 3270 terminals. Since the good old 3278s were replaced almost everywhere with intelligent PCs, there should be an extra level that could be summarized as USE. The authority to read a file is obviously not the same as the right to download the file out of its own environment (or the other way around). Imagine, for instance, a customer file with client data. Some employees undoubtedly need the right to consult this information, but this does not amount to the same as the right to take data with them when they leave the company. There exist several ways to extract data from an OS/390 system. To name just a few:

- Remote Job Entry (RJE).
- Network Job Entry (NJE).
- Netview File Transfer Program (NFTP).
- Mail systems (SMTP).
- TCP/IP File Transfer Program (FTP).
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
- 3270 Emulation program macros.

One of the most easy to use, however, is the nice Graphical User Interface (GUI) that comes with almost every PC-based 3270 emulation program, such as IBM's eNetwork Personal Communications or Attachmate's Extra Personal Client. For TSO/E sessions (most of them also support a CICS FTP), this form of file transfer relies on the IND\$FILE program on the

host. The IND\$FILE command processor comes standard with OS/390 and z/OS and is located in the linklist dataset SYS1.CMDLIB. Without any special knowledge, everybody can download a file to a PC medium – such as a floppy, USB drive, CD, or DVD – provided they have RACF READ access to the mainframe dataset.

The purpose of this article is to describe a way to protect the use of the IND\$FILE command processor by RACF profiles.

MECHANISM

When a 3270 emulation program downloads or uploads a file in a TSO/E environment, the client program will execute a command processor called IND\$FILE with a number of arguments (called subcommands). The subcommands consist of the direction of the transfer (GET or PUT), the name of the file (with or without quotes), the carriage return line feed (CRLF) conversion, the ASCII/EBCDIC translation, etc. The SMP/E user modification below wraps the original IND\$FILE with a small program that calls RACF to see whether the user has access to the FACILITY class profile:

```
IND$FILE.<direction>.<datasetname>
```

where <direction> is 'GET' or 'PUT' and <dataset name> can be a fully or partly specified file name.

Independently of the user's access rights in the DATASET class, the file transfer is then accepted or refused. If accepted, it could well be that RACF still refuses the download or upload if the DATASET class access right is NONE for the user. On the other hand, the user could have the highest possible DATASET class access level (ALTER), but could be refused by the FACILITY class profile to download or upload the file.

The design is not flawless. Imagine that a user may read datasets A and B, but is authorized to download only A. It might be possible for this user to rename B to A and the download would go through. On the other hand, with a careful

implementation, this kind of situation can be avoided. The most important thing is that at least a binary implementation (yes you may, no you may not) can now be put in place. How many people in the organization really need to transfer files from or to a PC from TSO/E? Probably not that many. By activating the mechanism, RACF is also capable of auditing the transfers so that there is at least a trace in case of problems.

IMPLEMENTATION

Putting the program in place is quite straightforward if the definitions are left unchanged. Alternatively you may prefer to use other profile names or even an entirely new RACF class. The implementation of the usermod 'as is' requires the following actions.

RACF

Class

The FACILITY class was provided by IBM as a container for user implemented profiles. Using a different class is possible but activating one requires changes in the RACF class (ICHRRCDE) and router (ICHRFR01) tables. If the class is defined, it must also be activated by the command:

```
SETROPTS CLASSACT(<classname>)
```

If the class is raclisted, like FACILITY for instance, don't forget to refresh it by issuing:

```
SETROPTS REFRESH RACLIST(<classname>)
```

Profiles

Assuming that you want the default to be that nobody can download or upload files, and that you use the FACILITY class:

```
RDEFINE FACILITY IND$FILE.*.* UACC(NONE)
```

The members of the SYSPROG group have the right to download SYS1 files:

```
RDEFINE FACILITY IND$FILE.GET.SYS1.* UACC(NONE)
PERMIT IND$FILE.GET. SYS1.* CLASS(FACILITY) ID(SYSPROG) ACC(READ)
```

The APPL1 group can only log-on to the system from diskless workstations (defined to RACF as TNODISK). They may upload and download any dataset with APPL1 as the First-Level Qualifier (FLQ) because they produce reports based on mainframe data that are afterwards uploaded and distributed by the mainframe again.

```
RDEFINE FACILITY IND$FILE.*.APPL1.* UACC(NONE)
PERMIT IND$FILE.*.APPL1.* CLASS(FACILITY) ID(APPL1) ACC(READ) +
WHEN(TERMINAL(TNODISK))
```

SMP/E

The IND\$FILE module is known to SMP/E, so every modification to it must be done using a user modification. Two new macros used in the wrapping program – EYECATCH and AMODE24 – are introduced to the MVS base element Function Management Identification (FMID). The source of the module itself is related to the FMID of the original IND\$FILE load module. In order to keep all our user modifications in an easy to reinstall format, we define them into distribution libraries (DLIBs) of our own. Assembler programs go into JEDPLX1.V2R7.AJEDMAC, load modules into AJEDLINK, and macros into AJEDSRC. Before implementing, check the FMIDs and the linkage-edit parameters of IND\$FILE as seen by SMP/E.

Example

The RACF display:

```
RACF - GENERAL RESOURCE SERVICES - DISPLAY
OPTION ==>
```

```
ENTER THE FOLLOWING PROFILE INFORMATION:
```

```
CLASS      ==> facility
```

```
PROFILE    ==> ind$file.get.jedplx1.**
```

<==end of data

Returns:

```
BROWSE - RACF COMMAND OUTPUT----- LINE 00000000 COL 001 080
  COMMAND ===>                                SCROLL ===> CSR
***** Top of Data *****
CLASS      NAME
-----
FACILITY   IND$FILE.GET.JEDPLX1.** (G)

LEVEL  OWNER      UNIVERSAL ACCESS  YOUR ACCESS  WARNING
-----
  00    IBZZEX4          NONE              NONE         NO
```

The file transfer triggered by the 3270 emulation program generated:

```
ISPF Command Shell
Enter TSO or Workstation commands below:
==> IND$FILE GET JEDPLX1.L.ASM(IND2) ASCII CRLF
```

which produced the message:

```
SE-IND$FILE: MSG04 NON-ZERO SAF OR RACF RETURN/REASON CODE:
SE-IND$FILE: MSG04A SAF RETURN CODE: 00000008
SE-IND$FILE: MSG04A RACF RETURN CODE: 00000008
SE-IND$FILE: MSG04A RACF REASON CODE: 00000000
```

The user had ALTER access to the JEDPLX1.** datasets.

CODE

The job below installs the SMP/E user modification. When the APPLY CHECK is OK, it must be replaced by an APPLY to effectively install the program.

```
//IBZZEX4X JOB (JAN),'JAN DE DECKER',CLASS=A,MSGCLASS=X,NOTIFY=&SYSUID,
//          REGION=0M
//*
//* PREPARATION: COPY THE SOURCES TO A TEMPORARY VIO DATASET
//*
//S0      EXEC PGM=IEBUPDTE,PARM='NEW'
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
//SYSIN   DD *
./ ADD NAME=IND$FILX
          TITLE '*** IND$FILX: RACF IND$FILE WRAPPER                JANX
          DE DECKER ***'
*-----
```

* JED:SP N.V. SCHUITENKAAI 3 1000 BRUSSEL jan.de.decker@tiscali.be

*-----

*

* NAME: IND\$FILX

*

* PARAMETERS: STANDARD TSO/E COMMAND PROCESSOR CPPL

*

* PURPOSE: WRAPS IND\$FILE

*

* SYSTEM: OS/390 z/OS

*

* LINK: AMODE 24

*

RMODE 24

*

AC = 0 IS SUFFICIENT

*

REENTRANT

*

CHECK SMP/E SETTINGS OF IND\$FILE

*

* USE: APPLY AS A USERMOD TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR IND\$FILE

*

PROCESSING

*

* AUTHOR: JAN

DATE: 12/2003

*

* SAMPLE: N/A

*

* NOTES: FACILITY CLASS IS USED

*

DON'T USE WTO OR TPUT BEFORE PASSING CONTROL TO

*

THE REAL ENTRY POINT SINCE THE TSO/E '***' BLOCKS

*

AT LEAST MY EMULATION

*

* MODIFICATION:

*

*-----

R0	EQU	0	ALL REFERENCES TO REGISTERS MAPPED BY
R1	EQU	1	ASSEMBLER XREF OPTION
R2	EQU	2	
R3	EQU	3	
R4	EQU	4	
R5	EQU	5	
R6	EQU	6	
R7	EQU	7	
R8	EQU	8	
R9	EQU	9	
R10	EQU	10	
R11	EQU	11	
R12	EQU	12	
R13	EQU	13	
R14	EQU	14	
R15	EQU	15	
RA	EQU	10	
RB	EQU	11	


```

RC      EQU    12
RD      EQU    13
RE      EQU    14
RF      EQU    15
        EJECT
IND$FILX CSECT
IND$FILX AMODE 24
IND$FILX RMODE 24
        PRINT GEN
        BAKR RE,Ø          STACK REGISTERS AND PSW
        LR   RC,RF        RC -> OUR CSECT
        USING IND$FILX,RC ADDRESS IND$FILX WITH RC
        LR   RA,R1        RA -> PARAMETER LIST
        EYECATCH        AS IT SAYS
        AMODE24          CHANGES AMODE,RØ AND R1
*
* WE MUST BE REENTRANT, FETCH SOME STORAGE, CLEAR IT AND DO THE
* SAVEAREA THING
*
        GETMAIN RC,          STORAGE FOR WORKAREA          X
            LV=L_WORK        AMOUNT IS EQUATED
        LTR  RF,RF          GETMAIN OK?
        BZ   LØØØØ        YES -> CONTINUE
        ABEND 1ØØ          NO --> ABEND
LØØØØ  DS   ØH
        LR   R2,R1        R2 -> WORK AREA
        LR   R4,R1        R4 -> WORK AREA
        LR   R6,R1        R6 -> WORK AREA
        LA   R7,L_WORK    R7 = L(WORK AREA)
        XR   R5,R5        R5 = Ø
        MVCL R6,R4        CLEAR WORK AREA
        USING WORKAREA,R2 R2 ADDRESSES OUR WORKAREA
        MVC  SAVEAREA+4(4),=C'F1SA' SET LINKAGE STACK INDICATOR
        LA   RD,SAVEAREA  RD -> SAVEAREA
*
        ST   RA,PARMS    KEEP PARAMETER POINTER
        EJECT
*
* START OF PROCESSING
*
* R2 ADDRESSES OUR WORKAREA DSECT
* RA ADDRESSES OUR CPPL
* RC ADDRESSES OUR CSECT
* RD POINTS TO OUR SAVEAREA
*
* R3 WILL ADDRESS THE COMMAND LINE
* R4 WILL CONTAIN THE LENGTH OF THE COMMAND BUFFER INCLUDING THE 4
*   BYTE HEADER
* R8 WILL SHUFFLE THROUGH THE DSN PART OF THE ENTITY FIELD
* R9 WILL COUNT THE BYTES IN THE ENTITY

```

```

*
* DO SOME RUDIMENTARY CHECKS AND FETCH THE SUBCOMMAND (GET/PUT)
*
      MVC   D_PRE,S_PRE           MESSAGE PREFIX
      USING CPPL,RA              RA ADDRESSES THE PARAMETER LIST
      L     R3,CPPLCBUF          R3 -> COMMAND BUFFER
      LH   R4,Ø(R3)             R4 = L(COMMAND BUFFER)
      CH   R4,=H'17'           MINIMUM LENGTH = 14 LIKE IN
      BH   LØØ1Ø                LENGTH IS OK
*                                     (4B HEADER) + 'IND$FILE GET X'
* THE COMMAND LENGTH IS TOO SMALL:
* ISSUE MESSAGE MSGØØ AND RETURN TO CALLER
*
      MVC   MSG,BLANKS           BLANK OUT MESSAGE LINE
      MVC   MSG(L'MSGØØ),MSGØØ   MESSAGE TO DYNAMIC BUFFER
      LA   RØ,L_S_PRE+L'MSGØØ   RØ = L(MESSAGE)
      LA   R1,TPUT_MSG          R1 -> MESSAGE
      TPUT (R1),(RØ)            WRITE TO TERMINAL
      B    THE_END              AND RETURN TO CALLER
LØØ1Ø   DS   ØH
      LA   R3,4(R3)             R3 -> COMMAND
      SH   R4,=H'4'            --(THE 4 HEADER BYTES)
      CLC  =C'IND$FILE ',Ø(R3)  COMMAND OK?
      BE   LØØ2Ø                YES -> CONTINUE
*
* INTERNAL TSO/E INCONSISTENCY, THE COMMAND IS NOT IND$FILE
* ISSUE MESSAGE MSGØ1
*
      MVC   MSG,BLANKS           BLANK OUT MESSAGE LINE
      MVC   MSG(L'MSGØ1),MSGØ1  MESSAGE TO DYNAMIC BUFFER
      LA   RØ,L_S_PRE+L'MSGØ1   RØ = L(MESSAGE)
      LA   R1,TPUT_MSG          R1 -> MESSAGE
      TPUT (R1),(RØ)            WRITE TO TERMINAL
      B    THE_END              AND RETURN TO CALLER
      EJECT
LØØ2Ø   DS   ØH
      LA   R3,9(R3)             R3 -> FIRST SUBCOMMAND
      OC   Ø(3,R3),BLANKS       TRANSLATE TO UPPER CASE
      CLC  =C'GET ',Ø(R3)       IS IT A GET REQUEST?
      BE   LØØ3Ø                NO --> GO CHECK PUT
      CLC  =C'PUT ',Ø(R3)       IS IT A PUT REQUEST?
      BE   LØØ3Ø                NO --> GO CHECK PUT
*
* THE SUBCOMMAND IS 'GET' NOR 'PUT'
* ISSUE MESSAGE MSGØ2 AND RETURN TO CALLER
*
      MVC   MSG,BLANKS           BLANK OUT MESSAGE LINE
      MVC   MSG(L'MSGØ2),MSGØ2  MESSAGE TO DYNAMIC BUFFER
      LA   RØ,L_S_PRE+L'MSGØ2   RØ = L(MESSAGE)
      LA   R1,TPUT_MSG          R1 -> MESSAGE

```

```

        TPUT (R1),(R0)          WRITE TO TERMINAL
        B     THE_END          AND RETURN TO CALLER
        EJECT

*
* CONSTRUCT THE DATASETNAME FROM THE COMMANDLINE AND THE PROFILE PREFIX
*
L0030  DS     0H
        SH    R4,=H'13'      R4 = #(REMAINING BYTES)
        MVC   PROFILE,=CL9'IND$FILE.' SET PROFILE PREFIX
        MVC   SUBCOM(3),0(R3) GET THE SUBCOMMAND IN THE ENTITY
        MVI   SUBCOM+3,C'.'  ADD '.'
        LA    R9,13          R9 = L(RACF ENTITY) SOFAR
        LA    R3,4(R3)       R3 -> FIRST CHARACTER DSN
        LA    R8,DSN         R8 -> START DSN PART ENTITY
        CLI   0(R3),X'7D'    IS IT A QUOTE?
        BNE   L0040          YES-> GO COPY DSN AS IS
        LA    R3,1(R3)       R3 -> PAST QUOTE
        BCTR  R4,0           --#(REMAINING BYTES IN COMMAND)
        LTR   R4,R4          ONLY A QUOTE?
        BNZ   L0050          NO --> CONTINUE WITH DSN

*
* THE DSNAME CONSISTS OF ONLY A QUOTE
* ISSUE MESSAGE MSG03 AND RETURN TO CALLER
*
        MVC   MSG,BLANKS     BLANK OUT MESSAGE LINE
        MVC   MSG(L'MSG03),MSG03 MESSAGE TO DYNAMIC BUFFER
        LA    R0,L_S_PRE+L'MSG03 R0 = L(MESSAGE)
        LA    R1,TPUT_MSG    R1 -> MESSAGE
        TPUT (R1),(R0)       WRITE TO TERMINAL
        B     THE_END          AND RETURN TO CALLER
        EJECT

L0040  DS     0H
        L     RA,CPPLUPT     RA -> USER PROFILE TABLE
        DROP RA              FORGET THE CPPL
        USING UPT,RA        RA ADDRESSES THE UPT
        XR    R5,R5          R5 = 0
        IC    R5,UPTPREFL    R5 = L(PREFIX)
        LTR   R5,R5          IS THERE A PREFIX?
        BZ    L0050          NO --> CONTINUE
        AR    R8,R5          ADAPT THE DSN POINTER
        AR    R9,R5          ADAPT THE LENGTH OF THE ENTITY
        BCTR  R5,0           --R5 FOR EXECUTE
        LA    R6,DSN         R8 -> START DSN PART ENTITY
        LA    R7,UPTPREFIX   R7 -> PREFIX
        DROP  RA              FORGET THE UPT
        EX    R5,S_MVC       MOVE TSO PROFILE TO RACF ENTITY
        MVI   0(R8),C'.'    ADD '.' AFTER THE PREFIX
        LA    R8,1(R8)       ++(DSN NEXT BYTE POINTER)
        LA    R9,1(R9)       ++LENGTH(ENTITY)

L0050  DS     0H

```

```

XR      R5,R5          R5 = 0 (COUNTER)
LR      R6,R3          R6 -> FIRST BYTE DSNAME
LR      R7,R4          R7 = REMAINING # BYTES IN BUFFER
L0060  DS      0H
        CLI     0(R6),C'('          START OF MEMBER?
        BE     L0070          YES -> WE ARE AT THE END
        CLI     0(R6),X'7D'        QUOTE?
        BE     L0070          YES -> WE ARE AT THE END
        CLI     0(R6),C' '        BLANK?
        BE     L0070          YES -> WE ARE AT THE END
        LA     R5,1(R5)          ++COUNTER
        LA     R6,1(R6)          R6 -> NEXT BYTE IN BUFFER
        BCT    R4,L0060          LOOP FOR THE # REMAINING BYTES
L0070  DS      0H
        LR     R6,R8          R6 -> NEXT BYTE IN ENTITY
        LR     R7,R3          R7 -> FIRST BYTE COMMAND BUFFER
        AR     R9,R5          R9 = L(ENTITY)
        BCTR   R5,0          --R5
        EX     R5,S_MVC        MOVE REMAINING OF DSNAME

```

*

* PREPARE FOR RACF CALL, DSN IS ALREADY FILLED IN

*

```

OC      PROFILE(L_PROF),BLANKS  PROFILE TO UPPER CASE
LA      R4,L_ENTITY            R2 = L(ENTITY BUFFER)
STH     R4,L_BUF              STORE IN RACF ENTITY
STH     R9,L_RES              STORE L(PROFILE)
LA      R4,ENTITYX            R4 -> ENTITY
LA      R5,RACWORK            R5 -> RACF WORK AREA
MVC     D_RACR(L_S_RACR),S_RACR COPY STATIC CALL TO DYNAMIC AREA
RACROUTE REQUEST=AUTH,        REQUEST AUTHORITY X
        ENTITYX=((R4),NONE),   FOR THIS PROFILE X
        WORKA=(R5),           DETAILS ARE HERE X
        RELEASE=2.6,          RACF RELEASE IS CONTROLLED X
        MF=(E,D_RACR)         MACRO FORMAT

```

*

```

LR      R4,RF                R4 = SAF RETURN CODE
LA      R5,D_RACR            R5 -> RACROUTE PARAMETER LIST
USING   SAFP,R5              R5 ADDRESSES SAF PARAMETER LIST
LTR     R4,R4                SAF RETURN CODE OK?
BNZ     L0080                NO --> MESSAGE WITH SAF AND

```

*

```

        RACF ERROR CODES
CLC     SAFPRRET,=F'0'        RACF RETURN CODE = 0?
BNE     L0080                NO --> MESSAGE WITH SAF AND

```

*

```

        RACF ERROR CODES
CLC     SAFPRREA,=F'0'        RACF REASON CODE = 0?
BE      L0090                YES -> ALL IS WELL

```

*

* SAF AND/OR RACF REASON CODES ARE NON-ZERO

* ISSUE MESSAGE MSG04 AND RETURN TO CALLER

*

```

L0080 DS 0H
MVC MSG,BLANKS BLANK OUT MESSAGE LINE
MVC MSG(L'MSG04),MSG04 MESSAGE TO DYNAMIC BUFFER
LA R0,L_S_PRE+L'MSG04 R0 = L(MESSAGE)
LA R1,TPUT_MSG R1 -> MESSAGE
TPUT (R1),(R0) WRITE TO TERMINAL
*
* SAF RETURN CODE IS IN R4
*
MVC MSG,BLANKS BLANK OUT MESSAGE LINE
MVC MSG(L_MSG04A),MSG04A MESSAGE TO DYNAMIC BUFFER
MVC MSG+ORIGIN(4),=CL4'SAF' INDICATE ORIGINATOR, AND TYPE
MVC MSG+CODETYPE(6),=CL6'RETURN'
*
ST R4,SAFRC KEEP FOR PRINTING
LA R8,SAFRC R8 -> RETURN CODE
LA R9,MSG+CODE R9 -> RECEIVE FIELD
BAL RE,PR_HEX GO PRINT CODE
*
LA R0,L_S_PRE+L_MSG04A R0 = L(MESSAGE)
LA R1,TPUT_MSG R1 -> MESSAGE
TPUT (R1),(R0) WRITE TO TERMINAL
*
* RACF RETURN CODE IS IN SAFPRRET
*
MVC MSG,BLANKS BLANK OUT MESSAGE LINE
MVC MSG(L_MSG04A),MSG04A MESSAGE TO DYNAMIC BUFFER
MVC MSG+ORIGIN(4),=CL4'RACF' INDICATE ORIGINATOR, AND TYPE
MVC MSG+CODETYPE(6),=CL6'RETURN'
*
LA R8,SAFPRRET R8 -> RETURN CODE
LA R9,MSG+CODE R9 -> RECEIVE FIELD
BAL RE,PR_HEX GO PRINT CODE
*
LA R0,L_S_PRE+L_MSG04A R0 = L(MESSAGE)
LA R1,TPUT_MSG R1 -> MESSAGE
TPUT (R1),(R0) WRITE TO TERMINAL
*
* RACF REASON CODE IS IN SAFPRREA
*
MVC MSG,BLANKS BLANK OUT MESSAGE LINE
MVC MSG(L_MSG04A),MSG04A MESSAGE TO DYNAMIC BUFFER
MVC MSG+ORIGIN(4),=CL4'RACF' INDICATE ORIGINATOR, AND TYPE
MVC MSG+CODETYPE(6),=CL6'REASON'
*
LA R8,SAFPRREA R8 -> RETURN CODE
LA R9,MSG+CODE R9 -> RECEIVE FIELD
BAL RE,PR_HEX GO PRINT CODE
*
LA R0,L_S_PRE+L_MSG04A R0 = L(MESSAGE)

```

```

        LA    R1,TPUT_MSG          R1 -> MESSAGE
        TPUT (R1),(R0)            WRITE TO TERMINAL
        DROP R5                   FORGET THE SAF PARAMETER LIST
        B     THE_END              AND RETURN TO CALLER
        EJECT

*
* SAF RETURN AND RACF AND REASON CODES ARE ALL ZERO
*
L0090   DS    0H
        L     R1,PARMS
        CALL INDFXFER
        EJECT

*
* END OF PROCESSING
*
THE_END DS    0H                  MY ONLY FRIEND, THE END
        FREEMAIN RU,              FREE THE WORK AREA           X
        A=(R2),                  ADDRESSED BY R2             X
        LV=L_WORK                 AND THIS LENGTH
        XR    RF,RF               ALWAYS RC = 0
        PR    .                   RETURN TO CALLER
        EJECT

*
* PR_HEX PROCEDURE
* AT INPUT R8 -> FULLWORD TO PRINT
*           R9 -> CL8 STRING TO RECEIVE
*
PR_HEX  DS    0H
        STM   R2,RA,TEMPSAVE
        XR    R7,R7                R7 = 0
        LA    R4,4                 R4 = 4
L0100   DS    0H
        IC    R7,0(R8)            R7 HAS FULL BYTE
        SRL   R7,4                 SHIFT OUT RIGHT HALF BYTE
        LA    R5,2
L0110   DS    0H
        CH    R7,=H'10'           R2 >= X'A'?
        BL    L0120               YES -> CONTINUE
        AH    R7,=H'183'         NO --> ADD X'C0'
        B     L0130               GO CHECK NEXT BYTE
L0120   DS    0H
        AH    R7,=H'240'         ADD X'F0'
L0130   DS    0H
        STC   R7,0(R9)           STORE IN RECEIVE FIELD
        LA    R9,1(R9)           POINT 1 BYTE FURTHER
        IC    R7,0(R8)           R7 HAS FULL BYTE
        N     R7,=X'0000000F'    FIRST HALFBYTE IS GONE
        BCT   R5,L0110           GO TRANSLATE THE SECOND HALF
        LA    R8,1(R8)           R8 -> NEXT FULLWORD BYTE
        BCT   R4,L0100

```

```

        LM      R2,R9,TEMPSAVE
        BR      RE
        EJECT

*
*  CONSTANTS
*
S_PRE    DC      C'SE-IND$FILE: '      MESSAGE PREFIX
L_S_PRE  EQU     *-S_PRE                L(MESSAGE PREFIX)
*
BLANKS   DC      131C' '              BLANKS
        EJECT

*
*  TERMINAL MESSAGES
*
MSG00    DC      C'MSG00 COMMAND LENGTH TOO SMALL'
MSG01    DC      C'MSG01 NOT IND$FILE INVOCATION'
MSG02    DC      C'MSG02 GET NOR PUT REQUEST'
MSG03    DC      C'MSG03 DSNAME TOO SHORT'
MSG04    DC      C'MSG04 NON-ZERO SAF OR RACF RETURN/REASON CODE:'
MSG04A   DS      0CL120
        DC      C'MSG04A '
ORIGIN   EQU     *-MSG04A
        DC      CL5' '
CODETYPE EQU     *-MSG04A
        DC      CL6' '
CODE     EQU     *-MSG04A
        DC      CL8' '
L_MSG04A EQU     *-MSG04A
        EJECT

*  STATIC RACF MACROS
S_RACR   RACROUTE REQUEST=AUTH,      REQUEST AUTHORITY           X
        ENTITYX=(,NONE),           FOR THIS PROFILE           X
        MSGSUPP=YES,              SUPPRESS RACF INTERNAL WTO X
        CLASS='FACILITY',        IN THIS CLASS             X
        ATTR=READ,                FOR THIS ACCESS           X
        RELEASE=2.6,              RACF RELEASE IS CONTROLLED X
        WORKA=,                   DETAILS ARE HERE          X
        MF=L                       MACRO FORMAT
L_S_RACR EQU     *-S_RACR           LENGTH STATIC RACROUTE
        EJECT

*  EXECUTE TARGETS
S_MVC    MVC     0(0,R6),0(R7)      STATIC EXECUTE
        EJECT

*  PARAMETER LISTS
        EJECT

*  EQUATES
        EJECT

*  LITERAL POOL

```

```

        LTORG
        EJECT
* DSECT'S
        PRINT GEN
WORKAREA DSECT          OUR DYNAMIC WORKAREA
SAVEAREA DS    18F      SAVEAREA
PARMS    DS    F        POINTER TO PARAMETER LIST
SAFRC    DS    F        SAF RETURN CODE
TEMPSAVE DS    18F
* TPUT MESSAGE AREA
TPUT_MSG DS    0F
D_PRE    DS    CL(L_S_PRE)    PREFIX
MSG      DS    CL120         MESSAGE
L_MSG    EQU    *-TPUT_MSG    L(TOTAL MESSAGE)
* THE RACF FACILITY PROFILE IS OF THE FORM:
* IND$FILE.<SUBCOMMAND>.<DSN>
* EXAMPLE: IND$FILE.GET.SYS1.CMDLIB
ENTITYX  DS    0F          PROFILE
L_BUF    DS    H          BUFFER LENGTH
L_RES    DS    H          RESOURCE NAME LENGTH
PROFILE  DS    CL9        FACILITY PROFILE PREFIX
SUBCOM   DS    CL4        FACILITY PROFILE SUBCOMMAND
DSN      DS    CL44       FACILITY PROFILE DSN
L_PROF   EQU    *-PROFILE  L(PROFILE)
L_ENTITY EQU    *-ENTITYX  L(ENTITY BUFFER)
*
D_RACR   DS    XL(L_S_RACR) DYNAMIC RACF RACROUTE AREA
RACWORK  DS    1024X      RACF WORK AREA
L_WORK   EQU    *-WORKAREA LENGTH OF ENTIRE WORKAREA
*
        ICHSAFP .        SAF RACROUTE PARAMETER LIST
        IKJCPPL .        COMMAND PROCESSOR PARAMETER LIST
        IKJUPT .         USER PROFILE TABLE
*
        END
./ ADD NAME=AMODE24
        MACRO
* THIS MACRO SETS THE AMODE OF YOUR PROGRAM TO 24
*
* THE CONTENT OF REGISTER 1 IS DESTROYED
&LABEL  AMODE24
        LA    R1,JED2&SYSNDX    R1 -> JED2XXXX
        N     R1,JED1&SYSNDX    SET FIRST BIT OFF
        BSM   R0,R1             BRANCH AND SET MODE
JED1&SYSNDX DS    0F          FULL WORD BOUNDARY FOR AND
        DC    X'7FFFFFFF'      SET FIRST BIT OFF
JED2&SYSNDX DS    0H
*
        MEND
./ ADD NAME=EYECATCH

```



```

MACRO
&LABEL EYECATCH
      B      M&SYSNDX                SKIP BRANCH AROUND DCS
      DC     C'JAN DE DECKER -- JED:SP N.V.'
      DC     C' MODULE: '
SYSECT DC     CL8'&SYSECT'          MODULE NAME
      DC     C' ASM DATE: '
      DC     CL8'&SYSDATE'          DATE
      DC     C' ASM TIME: '
      DC     CL8'&SYSTIME'          TIME
*
M&SYSNDX DS     ØH
        MEND
/*
//SYSUT2 DD DSN=&&SRC,DISP=(NEW,PASS),
//          DCB=(DSORG=PO,LRECL=8Ø,BLKSIZE=616Ø),
//          UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(CYL,(1,1,1))
/*
/* COPY THE SOURCES TO THE DLIBS
/*
//S1      EXEC PGM=IEBCOPY
//SRC     DD DISP=(OLD,PASS),DSN=&&SRC
//AMACLIB DD DISP=OLD,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.AJEDMAC
//ASRCLIB DD DISP=OLD,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.AJEDSRC
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
//SYSIN   DD *
COPY INDD=SRC,OUTDD=ASRCLIB
SELECT M=(IND$FILX)
COPY INDD=SRC,OUTDD=AMACLIB
SELECT M=(AMODE24,EYECATCH)
/*
/*
/* PREPARATION: CREATE AN OBJECT DECK IN A TEMPORARY DATASET
/*
//S2      EXEC PGM=ASMA9Ø,PARM='OBJECT,NODECK,RENT'
//SYSLIB DD DSN=SYS1.MACLIB,DISP=SHR
//          DD DSN=SYS1.MODGEN,DISP=SHR
//          DD DSN=JEDSP.T.MACRO,DISP=SHR
//SYSUT1 DD UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(CYL,(1,1))
//SYSUT2 DD UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(CYL,(1,1))
//SYSUT3 DD UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(CYL,(1,1))
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
//SYSPUNCH DD DUMMY,SYSOUT=*
//SYSLIN DD DSN=&&OBJ(IND$FILX),DISP=(NEW,PASS),
//          DCB=(DSORG=PO,LRECL=8Ø,BLKSIZE=616Ø),
//          UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(CYL,(1,1,1))
//SYSIN   DD DISP=(OLD,PASS),DSN=&&SRC(IND$FILX)
/*
/* PREPARATION: LINK THE OBJECT INTO THE DLIB
/*          EXPECT CONDITION CODE 4 (IEW2454W FOR INDFXFER)

```

```

/**
//S3      EXEC PGM=IEWL,PARM='NCAL'
//SYSLMOD DD DISP=OLD,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.AJEDLINK
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
//SYSUT1  DD UNIT=VIO,SPACE=(CYL,(1,1))
//SYSLIN  DD DISP=(OLD,PASS),DSN=&&OBJ(IND$FILX)
//        DD *
        ENTRY IND$FILX
        NAME IND$FILX(R)
/**
/**
/** SMP/E STEP TO APPLY THE MACROS AND THE SOURCE
/**
//S4      EXEC PGM=GIMSMP
//SMPCSI  DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SMVS270S.GLOBAL.CSI
//JEDSRC  DD DISP=SHR,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.JEDSRC
//AJEDSRC DD DISP=SHR,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.AJEDSRC
//AJEDLINK DD DISP=SHR,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.AJEDLINK
//AJEDMAC DD DISP=SHR,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.AJEDMAC
//SYSLIB  DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.MACLIB
//MACLIB  DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.MACLIB
//CMDLIB  DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.CMDLIB
//SRC     DD DISP=(OLD,DELETE),DSN=&&SRC
//OBJ     DD DISP=(OLD,DELETE),DSN=&&OBJ
//SMPCNTL DD *
        SET BDY(MVST100) .
        UCLIN .
        REP LMOD(IND$FILE)
            NCAL
            REUS
            RENT
++LMODIN
        ENTRY      IND$FILX
        NAME      IND$FILE(R)
++ENDLMODIN .
        ENDUCL .
        SET BDY(MVST100).                /* -> TARGET ZONE          */
        RESTORE S(GUMOD60                /* RESTORE AMODE24 MACRO   */
                GUMOD61                  /* EYECATCH MACRO         */
                GUMOD62) .                /* IND$FILX SOURCE        */
        RESETRC .
        SET BDY(GLOBAL).                 /* -> GLOBAL ZONE          */
        REJECT S(GUMOD60                 /* REJECT AMODE24 MACRO   */
                GUMOD61                  /* EYECATCH MACRO         */
                GUMOD62) .                /* IND$FILX SOURCE        */
        RESETRC .
        SET BDY(GLOBAL).                 /* -> GLOBAL ZONE          */
        RECEIVE S(GUMOD60                /* RECEIVE AMODE24 MACRO  */
                GUMOD61                  /* EYECATCH MACRO         */
                GUMOD62)                  /* IND$FILX SOURCE        */

```

```

        SYSMODS.
SET BDY(MVST100).                /* -> TARGET ZONE          */
APPLY  S(GUMOD60                 /* APPLY AMODE24 MACRO     */
        GUMOD61                 /* EYECATCH MACRO         */
        GUMOD62)                /* IND$FILX SOURCE        */
        CHECK
.
/*
//SMPPTFIN DD DATA,DLM=##
++USERMOD(GUMOD60).
++VER(Z038) FMID(HBB6606).
++MAC(AMODE24)                  /* NAME OF NEW MACRO      */
        DISTLIB(AJEDMAC)        /* DDNAME OF DLIB        */
        TXLIB(SRC)              /* SOURCE                 */
        SYSLIB(MACLIB) .        /* DDNAME OF TARGET      */
++USERMOD(GUMOD61).
++VER(Z038) FMID(HBB6606).
++MAC(EYECATCH)                /* NAME OF NEW MACRO      */
        DISTLIB(AJEDMAC)        /* DDNAME OF DLIB        */
        TXLIB(SRC)              /* SOURCE                 */
        SYSLIB(MACLIB) .        /* DDNAME OF TARGET      */
++USERMOD(GUMOD62).
++VER(Z038) FMID(HFX1112).
++SRC(IND$FILX)                /* NAME OF NEW SOURCE     */
        DISTLIB(AJEDSRC)        /* DDNAME OF DLIB        */
        TXLIB(SRC)              /* DDNAME OF INPUT SOURCE */
        DISTMOD(AJEDOBJ) .      /* DLIB FOR OBJECT       */
++JCLIN .
/**
/** JCLIN TO FORCE COPY FROM THE DLIB TO THE TARGET LIBRARY
/** FOR THE ASSEMBLER SOURCE
/** ASSEMBLY AND LINK IS DONE AUTOMATICALLY BY SMP/E
/**
//SMPES0 EXEC PGM=IEBCOPY
//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*
//JEDSRC DD DISP=SHR,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.JEDSRC
//AJEDSRC DD DISP=SHR,DSN=JEDPLX1.V2R7.AJEDSRC
//SYSIN DD *
COPY INDD=AJEDSRC,OUTDD=JEDSRC TYPE=SRC
SELECT M=(IND$FILX)
/*
++MOD(IND$FILX)                /* NAME OF NEW MODULE     */
        DISTLIB(ASPLINK)        /* DDNAME OF DLIB        */
        TXLIB(OBJ)              /* DDNAME OF INPUT OBJECT */
        LMOD(IND$FILE) .        /* RELATED LOADMODULE    */
##
//

```

CONCLUSION

There exist many ways to transfer files between the MVS system and non-mainframe machines. This could result in a potential security exposure since RACF does not differentiate between the right to use a dataset in its own environment and the right to export or import it to another machine. Just think of the difficulties you come across to have an outside tape put into the robots in the average shop; or, the other way around, put some files on a cassette and then try to get the cassette mounted to copy them onto the mainframe. The same should be true for all portable media, including the hard disks of LAN-capable laptops. This article is a first step, it secures only a small part of the system – file transfer with IND\$FILE. Nevertheless I hope it is the start of a discussion around the USE-level protection.

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RACF 101 – how RACF performs access checking

RACF 101 is a regular column for newcomers to the RACF world. It presents basic RACF topics in a tutorial format. In this issue, we will discuss the various ways a user can be granted (or denied) access to RACF resources.

OK, so now you know there are profiles for datasets and general resources, and, within each profile, there is an access list that always tells you who can access that resource, right? Well, not quite.

Sooner or later, you will find out that, although access lists in resource profiles (dataset or general resource) are the primary means used by RACF to provide access to resources, they are not the only source. In fact, the access lists are only the tip of

the iceberg. There are several other factors that influence RACF's decision-making process. RACF will take all these other factors into account before making its decision whether to grant or deny access.

Not knowing these other issues, you may wonder how someone is getting access to a resource, even though they are not in the access list of the profile.

These additional considerations can generally be grouped into three categories – resource-related specifications, user attributes, and other assorted considerations.

UNIVERSAL ACCESS

First, let's look at resource-related specifications.

For all RACF resource profiles, you can specify something called Universal ACCess, or UACC for short. The possible values you can specify for UACC are – NONE, READ, UPDATE, CONTROL, or ALTER.

If a resource profile has a UACC specified other than NONE, then everybody gets the access specified in the UACC. For example, if the value is READ, everybody gets READ access, regardless of whether they are in the access list or not.

If the UACC of a profile is UPDATE, and there is also an access list entry that gives READ to a user, then the user gets only READ. If, however, the UACC value is READ and the access list specifies UPDATE for a user, then the user gets UPDATE access. In other words, if some access is explicitly specified for the user, then that is what they will get.

To see the UACC on a profile, enter one of the list commands. For dataset profiles:

```
LISTDSD DA('dataset.name') ALL
```

For general resource profiles:

```
RLIST class.name profile.name ALL
```

Here is the sample output from the LISTDSD command (partial output). It shows that the UACC is NONE:

```
LISTDSD DA('ABCD.**')
```

```
INFORMATION FOR DATASET ABCD.** (G)
```

LEVEL	OWNER	UNIVERSAL ACCESS	WARNING	ERASE
----	-----	-----	-----	-----
00	USER999	NONE	NO	NO

GENERIC USERID

A profile may specify a generic (wildcard) entry. You will see this as '*' in the access list. This is another method of granting access to everybody, and its interpretation is similar to that of Universal Access described above.

There is a slight difference between granting access to everybody via a generic userid and doing the same thing via UACC. The difference is that UACC applies to 'undefined' RACF userids and 'defined' userids, whereas the generic id method applies only to 'defined' RACF users. It is OK if, as a beginner, you don't understand this subtle difference.

For now, just remember that if a userid is not explicitly mentioned in an access list, but there is a generic id present, then that user will get the access specified in the generic entry.

To see whether there is a generic id in an access list, enter one of the list commands. For dataset profiles:

```
LISTDSD DA('dataset.name') ALL
```

For general resource profiles:

```
RLIST class.name profile.name ALL
```

Here is the sample output from the LISTDSD command (partial output). It shows that there is a generic id present in the access list, and it gives READ to everybody.

```
INFORMATION FOR DATASET ACCOUNT.** (G)
```

```
. . .  
. . .
```

ID	ACCESS
----	-----
*	READ
USERnnn	UPDATE

WARN MODE

If a profile is in WARN mode, then FULL access is granted to everybody!

Of course, if the user is not in the access list, and does not qualify to get the access through other means, then the access attempt is logged, and a warning message is issued to the user. But still, you should be careful about profiles in WARN mode, since they grant ALL access, including ALTER access, to ALL users.

To see whether a profile is in WARN mode, enter one of the list commands. For dataset profiles:

```
LISTDSD DA('dataset.name') ALL
```

For general resource profiles:

```
RLIST class.name profile.name ALL
```

Here is the sample output from the LISTDSD command (partial output). It shows that the profile is in WARN mode (WARNING = YES):

```
INFORMATION FOR DATASET PROJ1.** (G)

LEVEL  OWNER      UNIVERSAL ACCESS  WARNING  ERASE
-----  -
  00    MGR0001    NONE             YES      NO
```

UNPROTECTED RESOURCES

If your installation has not told RACF to protect all your data, then whatever is not protected by RACF is available to everybody. In other words, if there is no profile for a resource, then that resource is available to everybody.

To see whether your installation is protecting all its data, enter the command:

SETROPTS LIST

And look for the PROTECT ALL option specified at your installation. If it says that PROTECT-ALL FAIL option is active, then you are protecting all your data.

Here is the partial output of the SETROPTS LIST command, showing that this installation is protecting all its resources.

```
PROTECT-ALL IS ACTIVE, CURRENT OPTIONS:  
  PROTECT-ALL FAIL OPTION IS IN EFFECT
```

That covers resource-related specifications. Now let us look at user-related attributes that can also determine a user's ability to access a resource.

OPERATIONS ATTRIBUTE

If a user has the OPERATIONS attribute, then that person can access any dataset unless they are explicitly prohibited by an entry in the access list! Also, if some of your resource classes are set up to 'honour' the OPERATIONS attribute, then all resources in those classes are also available to this user!

Of course, RACF will log this action after granting the access.

To see whether a person has the OPERATIONS attribute, enter the LISTUSER command:

```
LISTUSER USRSUPR
```

Here is partial output of this command, showing that the user has the OPERATIONS attribute.

```
USER=USRSUPR  NAME= SUPER USER      OWNER=GRPOWN1  CREATED=03.087  
  DEFAULT-GROUP=ABCD  PASSDATE=04.130  PASS-INTERVAL= 30  
  ATTRIBUTES=OPERATIONS
```

PRIVILEGED OR TRUSTED ATTRIBUTE

Started tasks generally have one of these special attributes (PRIVILEGED or TRUSTED). If they do, then they have access to all resources, datasets etc, at your installation. The difference between the two is that the TRUSTED attribute will

log the access granted, whereas the PRIVILEGED attribute will not.

To see whether a started task has the TRUSTED or PRIVILEGED attribute, use the RLIST command:

```
RLIST STARTED JES2.* STDATA
```

Here is a partial listing of the output from this command. The started task JES2 has the TRUSTED attribute (TRUSTED = YES):

```
CLASS      NAME
-----
STARTED    JES2.* (G)
. . .
. . .
STDATA INFORMATION
-----
USER= $JES2
GROUP= STCGRP
TRUSTED= YES
PRIVILEGED= NO
TRACE= NO
```

SPECIAL ATTRIBUTE

Users having the SPECIAL attribute do not directly have access to resources, but be aware that they are capable of giving themselves access to any resource by changing the access lists.

To see whether a person has the SPECIAL attribute, enter the LISTUSER command:

```
LISTUSER USR0001
```

Here is partial output of this command, showing that the user has the SPECIAL attribute (ATTRIBUTES = SPECIAL):

```
USER=USR0001  NAME= SPECIAL USER      OWNER=GRPOWN1  CREATED=03.087
  DEFAULT-GROUP=ABCD  PASSDATE=04.130  PASS-INTERVAL= 30
  ATTRIBUTES=SPECIAL
```

RESTRICTED ATTRIBUTE

RESTRICTED is one attribute that prevents a user from

having access that they would have otherwise had. In other words, a user having this attribute will not get any access allowed by UACC or a generic userid mentioned above. In addition, they will not get the access specified in the global access checking table mentioned below.

The only access they will get is where they are explicitly mentioned by userid in the access list (or if they are connected to a group that is mentioned in the access list).

To see whether a person has the RESTRICTED attribute, enter the LISTUSER command:

```
LISTUSER GUEST01
```

Here is partial output from this command, showing that the user has the RESTRICTED attribute (ATTRIBUTES = RESTRICTED):

```
USER=GUEST01  NAME= GUEST USER      OWNER=GRPOWN1  CREATED=03.087
  DEFAULT-GROUP=ABCD  PASSDATE=04.130  PASS-INTERVAL= 30
  ATTRIBUTES=RESTRICTED
```

OTHER

Finally, we will look at some other considerations that are not profile-related or user-related, but yet can play a role in determining access. This last category includes the global access checking table and exits.

Global access checking table

The global access checking table is a method RACF uses to allow access to commonly-used resources.

This is done for performance reasons only. If a matching entry for a profile is found in the global access checking table, then access is allowed, and the actual profile is not even checked. However, if this table does not allow access (that is, there is no matching entry), then the resource profile in question is still checked to see whether access should be allowed.

The global access checking table is most often associated

with datasets; however, any other resource can also be specified in this table.

To see entries in the global access checking table at your installation, enter the sample command:

```
RLIST GLOBAL DATASET
```

Here is a partial listing of the output:

```
CLASS      NAME
-----
GLOBAL     DATASET

MEMBER CLASS NAME
-----
GMBR

RESOURCES IN GROUP
-----
&RACUID.**/ALTER (G)
. . .
. . .
ISPF.**/READ (G)
```

The first entry, `&RACUID.**/ALTER (G)`, is interesting. It means: allow ALTER access to all datasets to all userids where the userid matches the first qualifier of the dataset.

For example, USER01 will have FULL access to all datasets that start with USER01.

Exits

Lastly, we come to a topic that a new RACF administrator should not be too concerned about.

Here we will mention only that exits in RACF can override the access checking criteria described above! This does not mean that installations use exits for this purpose. However, be aware that it can be done.

SUMMARY

In this column we saw that RACF access checking is not straightforward, and rightly so. As your knowledge of RACF

increases, you will appreciate that although complications discussed here sometimes make RACF difficult to understand, it is precisely these things that make RACF so powerful and versatile.

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A RACF course review

In preparation for Vanguard's recent RACF/Security conference, I took two Web-based training (WBT) courses to give me the right background to understand the kind of RACF sessions I wanted to attend. I was impressed with the level of information included. My boss was impressed with the price, or, more accurately, the cost/benefit – since cheap courses are a waste of money if they are not effective.

THE GOAL

My goal was to find courses I could take in modules, mostly at home, but also from my cubicle at work. I didn't want to VPN from home into Terminal Server at work because Terminal Server's 256-colour display can be hard on the eyes.

Computer-Based Training (CBT) was not considered because of the hassles involved in getting software installed on my desktop at work, and the need for two copies – one at home and one at work.

THE CHOICE

Based strictly on the course content, I chose DataTrain's *How to Use RACF*. It was six times the cost of the Serebra SMP/E course that I took two months earlier, but still extremely cheap

when compared with classroom courses. Though both courses did the job, DataTrain courses are just built better.

The Serebra course strongly recommended that I set my screen resolution to 800x600 and drop the number of colours displayed. DataTrain allows you to size your course window as you see fit. Yes, even full screen on my 1600x1200 20-inch LCD monitor at work.

Many of Serebra's questions, especially the fill-in-the-blanks ones, accept only one of several right answers; a few are just plain wrong. Not that DataTrain is perfect in this regard, but they do stick to multiple-choice questions and tell you how many right answers there are for each question. And DataTrain sticks to mainstream questions: the most important topics covered in the course.

The course text is pretty clean in both, with almost all errors occurring in the examples. Serebra has the higher error rate, though DataTrain varies: the RACF course was better than one on Unix System Services (USS).

Serebra overstates the course duration, while DataTrain seriously understates. Finally, neither provides the handouts you get in classroom courses. It was time-consuming, but I wrote my own, for future reference.

FINDING THEM

<http://www.datatrain.net/distrib.html> lists DataTrain distributors worldwide. Each distributor packages and prices in a different way. I paid US\$199 per course for a single student for three months.

<http://learn.serebra.com> takes you directly to Serebra's on-line store. I paid US\$30 per course for an unlimited number of students for three months.

Another reference, although over three years old now, is *RACF Update*, issue 24 (May 2001, pp. 33–59, <http://>

www.xephon.com/index/journals/more/RACF), which contains a round-up of all known relevant security training available at the time.

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Adiant (Canada)

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RACF news

Eurekify has announced Sage Discovery and Audit (DNA) for RACF. With Sage for RACF, administrators can analyse and audit existing privileges and groups, as well as create a new Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) privileges provisioning structure.

As soon as data is imported into Sage, system administrators can see who has access to what, and who else has similar access. Sage can then identify groups of users and/or collections of groups that share a characteristic set of privileges. Role definitions can then be stored as RACF groups, or into any other Identity Store of choice, including an Identity Management platform, Enterprise Directory, etc.

For further information contact:
Eurekify, Atidim Science Park, Building 3,
Fourth Floor (Einav), POB 58118, Tel Aviv
61580, Israel.
Tel: +972 3 644 1180.
URL: http://www.eurekify.com/sage_racf.htm.

* * *

Blockade Systems has released ManageID Enterprise Suite for Microsoft Identity Integration Server 2003, Enterprise Edition. This suite encompasses Management Agents for z/OS and OS/390 environments (RACF, plus ACF2 and Top Secret), which integrate with MIIS.

The product provides real-time event detection, which includes the ability to both detect and apply account creations or account deletions and account attribute or state changes on z/OS security environments.

For further information contact:
Blockade Systems, 2200 Yonge Street, Suite
1300, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M4S 2C6.
Tel: (416) 482 8400.
URL: <http://www.blockade.com/products/miis.html>.

* * *

Vanguard Integrity Professionals has announced Version 5.2 of Vanguard Security Solutions (VSS 5.2).

Vanguard Administrator provides a range of security administration, data mining, and reporting tools to simplify and enhance administration of the IBM Security Server (RACF). Vanguard SecurityCenter is the first Windows-based GUI for IBM Security Server and DB2 security administration. Users can interface with RACF. Vanguard Registration Manager provides the reporting and maintenance capabilities necessary to effectively manage the userid/platform matrix that is created by ez/SignOn. This includes the ability for users to recover map profiles, delete map profiles associated with a RACF user ID, and report by platform, username, and RACF user ID definitions.

For further information contact:
Vanguard Integrity Professionals, 3035 East
Patrick Lane, Suite 11, Las Vegas, NV 89120-
3478, USA.
Tel: (702) 794 0014.
URL: http://www.go2vanguard.com/software_solutions/new_in_5.2/.

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